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Abstract
The paper is an introduction into General Ether Theory (GET).
We start with few assumptions about an universal “ether” in a New-
tonian space-time which fulfils
∂tρ+ ∂i(ρv
i) = 0
∂t(ρv
j) + ∂i(ρv
ivj + pij) = 0
For an “effective metric” gµν we derive a Lagrangian where the
Einstein equivalence principle is fulfilled:
L = LGR − (8piG)−1(Υg00 − Ξ(g11 + g22 + g33))
√−g
We consider predictions (stable frozen stars instead of black holes,
big bounce instead of big bang singularity, a dark matter term), quan-
tization (regularization by an atomic ether, superposition of gravita-
tional fields), related methodological questions (covariance, EPR cri-
terion, Bohmian mechanics).
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1 Introduction
The purpose of the present work is to present an alternative metric theory
of gravity. The Lagrangian of the theory
L = LGR − (8piG)−1(Υg00 − Ξ(g11 + g22 + g33))
√−g
is very close to the GR Lagrangian, and in the limit Ξ,Υ→ 0 we obtain
the classical Einstein equations.
The key point is that this Lagrangian may be derived starting with
a few assumptions about the “ether” – a classical medium in a classical
Newtonian background with Euclidean space and absolute time R3⊗R. We
need only a few general principles: a Lagrange formalism and its relation
with standard conservation laws. The gravitational field gµν is defined by
the “general” steps of freedom of the ether – density ρ, velocity vi, pressure
pij.1 The matter fields describe its material properties. What explains the
Einstein equivalence principle is that the ether is universal: all fields describe
properties of the ether, there is no external matter. Therefore, observers
are also only excitations of the ether, unable to observe some of the ether
properties. This explains that we are unable to observe all steps of freedom
of the ether. We need no artificial conspiracy or highly sophisticated model
to obtain relativistic symmetry in an ether theory.
1As usual, we use latin indices for three-dimensional indices and greek indices for four-
dimensional indices. We also use the notation gˆµν = gµν
√−g.
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The only difference to GR are two additional terms which depend on
the preferred coordinates X i, T . In “weak” covariant formulation (with the
preferred coordinates handled as “fields” X i(x), T (x)) we obtain:
L = LGR − (8piG)−1(ΥgµνT,µT,ν − ΞgµνδijX i,µXj,ν)
√−g
Instead of no equation for the preferred coordinates, we obtain a well-
defined general equation for these coordinates: the classical conservation
laws, which appear to be the harmonic coordinate condition.
But this changes a lot. It is, essentially, a paradigm shift as described
by Kuhn [44]. We revive the metaphysics of Lorentz ether theory in its
full beauty. This requires the reconsideration of the whole progress made in
fundamental physics in this century. Therefore, after derivation of the theory
and their comparison with existing theories of gravity we reconsider different
domains of science from point of view of the new paradigm. Of course,
this may be only a raw overview, a program for future research instead of a
summary of results. But this raw overview does not suggest serious problems
for the new paradigm, while essential problems of the relativistic paradigm
disappear.
The preferred background leads to well-defined local energy and momen-
tum conservation laws. Moreover, the additional terms seem to be useful to
solve cosmological problems. The Ξ-term defines a nice homogeneous dark
matter candidate. The Υ-term is even more interesting: it avoids the big
bang singularity and leads instead to a bounce. Such a bounce makes the
cosmological horizon much larger and therefore solves the cosmological hori-
zon problem without inflation. This term stops also the gravitational collapse
immediately before horizon formation. Because of the underlying Euclidean
symmetry, the flat universe is the only homogeneous universe. Therefore,
GET is not only in agreement with observation, but allows to solve some
serious cosmological problems solved today by inflation theory.
A very strong argument in favour of GET is the violation of Bell’s inequal-
ity. In our opinion, it is a very simple and decisive proof of the existence of a
preferred foliation – as simple and decisive as possible in fundamental physics.
Only if we try to avoid this simple conclusion, the issue becomes complicate
– we have to reject simple fundamental principles like the EPR criterion of
reality or causality. In our opinion, there is a lot of confusion in this question.
For example, it is often assumed that the EPR criterion is in contradiction
6
with quantum theory. But the existence of Bohmian mechanics proves that
there is no such contradiction.
In quantum field theory the reintroduction of a preferred frame does not
lead to problems. Instead, it allows to generalize Bohmian mechanics into the
relativistic domain and clarifies the choice of the Fock space in semiclassical
field theory.
The “ether hypothesis” suggests also a simple solution for the problem
of non-renormalizability. Technically, this solution is already known as “ef-
fective field theory”. In this concept, it is assumed that below a certain
cutoff scale the theory becomes really different. This concept has two fea-
tures where GET suggests modification: First, in the standard concept the
nature of the theory below this cutoff remains completely unspecified. In-
stead, GET suggests a well-defined framework: canonical quantum theory,
Newtonian space-time, and some “atomic ether theory”. Second, the cutoff
length is supposed to be the Planck length. Instead, GET makes a pre-
diction which is inconsistent with Planck length – the cutoff is defined by
g00
√−gVcutoff = 1. As a consequence, the cutoff length seems to increase in
a homogeneous “expanding” universe.
Remarkably, all these results are only side-effects. It was not the origi-
nal intention of the author to revive old ether theory. Instead, the author
shares the common admiration for the beauty of GR. It was also not the
intention to solve cosmological problems – they have been considered only
after the derivation of the Lagrangian. We also have not tried to save the
EPR criterion or to generalize Bohmian mechanics.
The original motivation was different. It was a quantum gravity thought
experiment which has convinced the author that a Newtonian framework is
necessary. The question is if a “one world theory” as GR is sufficient to
describe superpositions of different gravitational fields, or if such a super-
position depends on relations between the superposed fields, their “relative
position”. To decide this question, we consider a simple interaction of a
superposition of quasiclassical fields with a test particle. We observe a tran-
sition probability which depends on such relative information. To describe
such transition probabilities in quantum gravity it seems necessary to intro-
duce a common background.
Last not least, it seems necessary to criticize some aspects of the relativis-
tic paradigm for quantum gravity. “Because of the lack of data, quantum
gravity is strongly influenced by philosophical prejudices of the researchers”
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[20], therefore, these prejudices have to be considered. We use Rovelli [63]
as a base for this consideration. It includes an excellent methodological part
we agree with. We criticize his relativistic argumentation and argue that our
consideration is in much better agreement with the proposed methodology.
2 General Ether Theory
Let’s now define general ether theory. We have a Newtonian framework –
absolute Euclidean space with orthonormal coordinates X i and absolute time
T. We have also classical causality – causal influence A→ B between events
A and B is possible only if T (A) ≤ T (B).
The ether is described by steps of freedom which are usual in condensed
matter theory: there is an “ether density” ρ(X, T ), an “ether velocity”
vi(X, T ) and an “ether pressure” pij(X, T ). As usual for a density, ρ > 0.
These steps of freedom define the gravitational field. The theory is a
metric theory of gravity, and the metric gµν is defined algebraically by the
following formula:
g00
√−g = ρ
gi0
√−g = ρvi
gij
√−g = ρvivj + pij
This formula is a variant of the ADM decomposition. Especially, vi is the
ADM shift vector.
Because the density ρ is always positive, this formula defines a Lorentz
metric if and only if the tensor pij is negative definite. Therefore, we make
the additional assumption that pij is negative definite.
2.1 The material properties of the ether
These are not all steps of freedom of the ether. Instead, there are other steps
of freedom, the “material properties” ϕm(X, T ) of the ether. But these steps
of freedom are not defined by GET. Instead, GET is a general theory only, it
describes only a few general properties, not all properties of the ether. It is,
therefore, a meta-theory, a general scheme for an ether theory. Different ether
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theories can fit into this scheme. Ether theories with well-defined material
properties and material laws we name “complete ether models”.
This is in no way strange for a theory of gravity. All metric theories of
gravity are general schemes in the same sense. They do not specify the mat-
ter steps of freedom and the matter Lagrangian. Nonetheless, they specify an
essential and very important property of the matter Lagrangian – that it ful-
fils the Einstein equivalence principle. Thus, the meta-theoretical character
is a common feature of theories of gravity.
GET in some sense explains this subdivision into a universal gravitational
field and matter fields. Indeed, there is a similar subdivision in condensed
matter theory – the subdivision between the few basic steps of freedom (like
density, velocity, pressure) which are common for very different materials and
the “material properties” which differ for different materials. In GET this
subdivision fits with the subdivision into gravity and matter fields: Density,
velocity and pressure are used to describe the gravitational field, while the
other material properties describe the matter fields.
This is an essential difference to classical ether theory. In the classical
concept, the ether is assumed to be something different from usual matter. In
GET, usual matter is described by continuous fields, and these fields describe
various properties of the ether.
But we not only assume that there are material properties of the ether
described by some matter fields. We assume more: all matter fields describe
material properties of the ether. There is no ethr-external matter:
Axiom 1 (universality) There is nothing except the ether. All fields de-
scribe steps of freedom of the ether.
Thus, the complete ether model is the theory of everything.
2.2 Conservation laws
In our covariant formalism, the conservation laws are the Euler-Lagrange
equations for the preferred coordinates Xµ (see (A.2)). Now, let’s try to find
these conservation laws. The main hypothesis is that these conservation laws
coinside with the classical conservation laws we know from condensed matter
theory.
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Axiom 2 (continuity equation) The mass of the ether is conserved. This
conservation is described by the classical continuity equation:
∂tρ+ ∂i(ρv
i) = 0 (1)
The other important equation of classical condensed matter theory is the
Euler equation. It is the conservation law for momentum:
Axiom 3 (Euler equation) The momentum of the ether is conserved.
This conservation is described by the classical Euler equation:
∂t(ρv
j) + ∂i(ρv
ivj + pij) = 0 (2)
Note that we have no terms for external forces or interaction with external
matter. The reason is that we have already incorporated here the universality
axiom – there is no momentum exchange with external matter, there are no
external forces. All “matter fields” are “material properties” of the ether.
These are already all ether equations specified by GET. All other equa-
tions are “material laws” of the ether, they depend on the “material proper-
ties” ϕm which have to be defined only by the complete ether model. GET
does not specify them.
Now, a key observation is what happens if if we rewrite the classical
conservation laws as equations for the effective metric gµν . We obtain a
well-known equation – the harmonic condition:
✷Xν = ∂µ(g
µν
√−g) = 0
2.3 Lagrange formalism
Amajor assumption is that we have a Lagrange formalism. We use the covari-
ant formulation of the theory: the preferred coordinates Xµ are considered
as fields, the Lagrangian depends on the fields Xµ(x) in a covariant way
(see §A.1). In this formalism, the conservation laws are the Euler-Lagrange
equations for the preferred coordinates (see (A.2)).
On the other hand, we have already found the conservation laws and
observed that they may be written as equations for the preferred coordinates.
Thus, it seems reasonable to assume that they are proportional:
10
δS
δXµ
= γµ✷X
µ
Now, the coefficients γµ may be different. We can use Euclidean symmetry
to argue that γ1 = γ2 = γ3, but there is no reason to suppose a relation
between γ0 and the γi.
Instead of the γµ we introduce introduce a diagonal matrix γµν with γµµ =
−4piGγµ. The factor 4piG is well-known from GR, and it seems natural to
introduce it here: in this case, the two constants Υ = γ00, Ξ = −γii appear in
a similar way as Einstein’s cosmological constant Λ. Now we can formulate
the
Axiom 4 (Lagrange formalism) There exists a “weak covariant” La-
grange formalism so that the Euler-Lagrange equations for the preferred co-
ordinates Xµ and the classical conservation laws for the ether ✷Xµ = 0 are
related in the following way:
δS
δXµ
= −(4piG)−1γµν✷Xν (3)
Now, let’s find the general Lagrangian which fulfils this assumption.
Theorem 1 The general Lagrangian for GET is
L = −(8piG)−1γµνgµν
√−g + LGR(gµν) + Lmatter(gµν , ϕm) (4)
Proof: First, we find a Lagrangian which fulfils the condition (3):
LGET = −(8piG)−1γµνXµ,αXν,βgαβ
√−g
For the difference we obtain
δ
∫
(L− LGET )
δXµ
= 0
Thus, the remaining part is “strong” covariant, that means, it is not only
covariant, but does not depend on the preferred coordinates Xµ too. But this
is the classical requirement for the Lagrangian of general relativity. Thus, we
can identify the difference with the classical Lagrangian of general relativity.
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L = LGET (gµν , X
µ) + LGR(gµν) + Lmatter(gµν , ϕ
m)
In the preferred coordinates LGET may be rewritten as
LGET = −(8piG)−1(Υg00 − Ξ(g11 + g22 + g33))
√−g
or in a more compact form as
LGET = −(8piG)−1γµνgµν
√−g
This proves the theorem.
It should be noted that we have no theoretical reason to fix the signs for
the cosmological constants Ξ,Υ,Λ. Their values should be fixed by observa-
tion.
3 Simple properties
Now we have defined GET and can describe its properties.
First, let’s write down the other Euler-Lagrange equations. As equations
for gµν we obtain the Einstein equations with two additional non-covariant
terms:
Gµν = 8piG(Tm)
µ
ν + (Λ + γκλg
κλ)δµν − 2gµκγκν (5)
As in GR, the equations for the matter fields ϕm depend on the matter
Lagrangian and remain unspecified.
The expression of the GET Lagrangian in terms of the original ether
variables is quite nice:
4piGΞ−1LGET =
1
2
(ρ|v|2 + pii −ΥΞ−1ρ)
3.1 Energy-momentum tensor
Now, we have derived the GET Lagrangian using assumptions about the
conservation laws. Therefore, to write dowm the energy-momentum tensor
is easy:
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T µν = (4piG)
−1γνκg
κµ
√−g
In this form, the tensor does not depend on the material properties ϕm of
the ether. But how is this energy-momentum tensor related with the usual
energy-momentum tensor for the matter fields? Now, the answer is simple.
We have to multiply the GET variant of the Einstein equation (5) with
√−g
and obtain the following decomposition of the full energy-momentum tensor:
T µν = (Tm)
µ
ν
√−g + (8piG)−1 ((Λ + γκλgκλ)δµν −Gµν)√−g
Thus, we obtain immediately what is missed in GR: an energy-momentum
tensor for the gravitational field.
3.2 Constraints
If we want to formulate an initial value problem for GR as well as GET,
we cannot simply define the initial values g0µν(x) = gµν(x, 0) and k
0
µν(x) =
∂tgµν(x, t)|t=0. Instead, we obtain the problem that the four equations
G0µ = ...
do not contain second order derivatives in time, that means, they define
constraints for the initial values. This is a common property in above theo-
ries, because the additional terms of GET do not add second order derivatives
of the gµν . Moreover, in GET the four conservation laws are also only first
order in time.
Nonetheless, their character is completely different. In GR, these con-
straints play a very special role in the ADM Hamilton formalism – the energy
H itself is a constraint. This is a consequence of the covariance of the GR
Lagrangian. In GET, as we have already seen, we have a well-defined local
energy and momentum density.
Even if the constraints are much more harmless in GET, they remain
to be constraints, which is not very nice. But there is some interesting
insight into the nature of the constraints in GET which has been found
for GR in harmonic coordinates by Choquet-Bruhat [22]. This insight was
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important for his proof of local existence and uniqueness theorems for GR. It
is remarkable in itself that this proof has been done in harmonic coordinates.
First, as has been observed by Lanczos [46], the Ricci tensor essentially
simplifies in harmonic coordinates:
R(h)µν = −
1
2
gαβ
∂2gµν
∂xα∂xβ
+Hµν
where Hµν does not contain second derivatives of the metric. Now, in
GET we have the harmonic condition Γµ = ∂ν(g
µν√−g) = 0 as an equation.
Therefore, for the initial values we have
Γµ(0, x) = 0 ∂tΓ
µ(0, x) = 0
The second condition contains a second order time derivative. But this
is true also for the Ricci tensor in harmonic coordinates. Now, if we use the
appropriate combination of this second initial condition and the equation in
harmonic coordinates, we obtain the four other first order constraints (see
[30], Lemma 22). Thus, all constraints are closely related to the harmonic
condition.
The ether interpretation gives additional insight. The point is that in
this interpretation the components ρvi = g0i
√−g are already velocities. A
second order equation for these components would be a third order equation
for the ether particles them-self. Therefore, it is very natural that there are
no such third order terms in the equations them-self.
4 Derivation of the Einstein equivalence
principle
The Einstein equivalence principle (EEP) is an immediate consequence of
the GET Lagrange density: the matter Lagrangian is covariant in the strong
sense, does not depend on the preferred coordinates Xµ. The question we
want to consider here is if there are generalizations of the GET axioms so
that the EEP remains correct.
At first we have to formulate the EEP in an appropriate way. The equa-
tions for matter do not depend on the preferred coordinates. In our covariant
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formalism there is a natural way to do formulate this property. The “equa-
tions for the matter” we identify with the Euler-Lagrange equations for ϕm,
and the property that they do not depend on the preferred coordinates Xµ
can be written as
δ
δXµ
δS
δϕm
= 0
To obtain a proof, let’s look how this property may be proven for the
GET Lagrangian:
Theorem 2 (Einstein equivalence principle) Let L be a weak covariant
Lagrangian with the conservation laws
∂µT
µ
ν = 0.
If the conservation laws do not depend on the variables ϕm, then the
Einstein equivalence principle holds for these variables.
Proof: The conservation laws in the weak covariant formalism are defined
as
δS
δXµ
= ∂νT
ν
µ = 0
The EEP follows immediately:
δ
δXµ
δS
δϕm
=
δ
δϕm
δS
δXµ
=
δ
δϕm
∂νT
ν
µ = 0
As we see, the first property we need is that the material properties are
not used in the conservation laws. This property depends on our choice of
pij as an independent variable. But this is only a technical question. More
important is the universality axiom – that the matter fields ϕm describe only
“material properties” of the ether. External steps of freedom, that means
other, non-ether fields which interact with the ether have some momentum
exchange with the ether. Therefore, there will be some interaction terms in
the momentum conservation laws.
But this may be partially weakened. If some steps of freedom ψn are
external forces or external matter, while other steps of freedom ϕm describe
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material properties of the ether, than the EEP does not hold for the external
steps of freedom, but remains valid for the material properties. The proof
remains the same.
The other property is that the conservation laws are the Euler-Lagrange
equations for the preferred coordinates:
δS
δXµ
= ∂νT
ν
µ
Now, this may be generalized for the case where we have explicit depen-
dencies on the preferred coordinates, and, therefore, no conservation laws.
All we need is that the equation does not depend on the material properties
ϕm.
Therefore, we conclude that the EEP holds for material properties ϕm
even in more general situations, if we have other external fields, external
forces, even explicit dependencies of the Lagrangian from the coordinates.
Let’s summarize: The EEP holds for a step of freedom ϕm only if it describes
a material property of the ether. The universality axiom explains why the
EEP holds for all matter fields.
4.1 Higher order approximations in a Lagrange for-
malism
Let’s consider now another possibility for generalization. We consider the
situation where we have to consider different approximations for a Lagrange
formalism. All we assume is that all approximations are consistent. For a
condensed matter theory that means that the conservation laws are valid.
Let’s compare now two approximations. For the approximation S = S0+ S1
we have
δS0
δXµ
= ∂νT
ν
µ
as well as
δS
δXµ
= ∂νT
ν
µ
Now, in this situation we do not even need that these conservation laws
do not depend on some fields ϕm. All we need now is that the two approx-
imations of the conservation laws are identical. This leads immediately to
the Einstein equivalence principle for the additional part of the Lagrangian:
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δS1
δXµ
= 0
This consideration suggests that it may be even easier to detect relativistic
symmetry in the higher order approximations. Sequences Sn of approxima-
tions appear in effective field theory.
4.2 Weakening the assumptions about the Lagrange
formalism
We have obtained the conservation laws with reference to condensed matter
theory. Then we have identified them with the conservation laws from the
weak covariant formalism. This is a quite natural, but non-trivial identifica-
tion. There are many different variants of the conservation laws, and even if
they are equivalent if the equations of motion are fulfilled, their functional
dependencies differ. Therefore, it would be nice to weaken this assumption.
Unfortunately, it seems impossible to prove something without an explicit
assumption which relates a certain conservation law with the Euler-Lagrange
equations. The property “there exists a Lagrange formalism” for some equiv-
alent system of equations is too weak. The problem is that there are various
methods of transformation of a given system of equations – multiplying them
with “integrating factors”, Lagrange multipliers, replacement of fields by po-
tentials. That’s why a general method which allows to decide if a given set of
equations is equivalent to a system of Euler-Lagrange equations is not known
[77]. That means, we are not even able to find all Lagrange formalisms for a
given set of equations.
It seems natural to assume that the equations already have the form of
Euler-Lagrange equations. Such systems of equations are “self-adjoint” and
have been considered in detail [66]. Especially there exist standard methods
to construct Lagrange densities which are also tests if the system is self-
adjoint [77]. Thus, let’s assume that the conservation laws are part of such
a self-adjoint system of equations, that means, are Euler-Lagrange equations
for some variables cµ:
δS
δcµ
= ∂νT
ν
µ
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This allows to derive a similar symmetry property of the equations for
ϕm:
δ
δcµ
δS
δϕm
=
δ
δϕm
δS
δcµ
=
δ
δϕm
∂νT
ν
µ = 0
Thus, we have a symmetry group with four continuous parameters, only
the relation between these parameters and the coordinates has been lost.
4.3 Explanatory power of the derivation
Last not least, it should be noted that the derivation of the EEP has very high
explanatory power. First, as we have seen, it is based on a few very general
principles. We do not need any special assumptions about the ether, no
“mechanical explanation”, no strange “mechanism”, no “conspiracy”. We
make non-trivial assumptions, but these non-trivial assumptions are very
natural for a condensed matter theory.
Evidence for the high explanatory power is that we can describe the proof
in a simple verbal way: The conservation laws can be understood as equations
for the preferred coordinates. Now, the conservation laws do not depend on
the material properties. Therefore, because of the principle “action equals
reaction”, the equations for the material properties do not depend on the
preferred coordinates.
5 Does usual matter fit into the GET
scheme?
If we compare the Einstein equations with usual hydro-dynamical equations,
they look very different. The Einstein equations depend on second order
derivatives of the gµν . At a first look, there seems to be no chance to unify
them.
GET suggests such a way. Indeed, in the derivation of GET we have
used only a few general properties of the ether. None of these assumptions is
obviously wrong for usual condensed matter theory. The material properties
of the GET ether remain unspecified. We cannot even tell if the ether is solid
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or liquid.2 This suggests that usual condensed matter may be described by
a GET-like Lagrangian.
5.1 The role of the Einstein Lagrangian
The problem with the second derivatives which appear in the Einstein equa-
tions can be easily solved: we have identified the “remaining part” of the
GET Lagrangian with the Einstein Lagrangian because of its strong covari-
ance. None of the GET axioms requires to include the Einstein-Hilbert term
LGR = R
√−g into the GET Lagrangian. It is simply a possible term in the
GET Lagrangian, not a necessary one. The same holds for covariant terms
with higher order.3 Moreover, in comparison with the three “cosmological
terms” g00
√−g, gii√−g,√−g of GET the Einstein-Hilbert term is a higher
order term. Therefore, in the first approximation for usual condensed matter
the Einstein-Hilbert term may be simply omitted. In this case, the GET
equation becomes an algebraic relation between the gravitational field de-
fined by ρ, vi, pij and the material properties ϕm. This is already much more
close to usual condensed matter theory.
On the other hand, GET suggests that the Einstein-Hilbert Lagrangian
should be used in higher order approximations of condensed matter theory.
The physical meaning of curvature-dependent term in condensed matter the-
ory is easy to understand: if curvature is zero, then there exists an undis-
torted reference state which remains unchanged in time. Therefore, curvature
describes inner stress and its change in time.
5.2 The role of Lorentz symmetry
Another property seems to be much more in contradiction with usual hy-
drodynamics – the Lorentz invariance of the GET Lagrangian. The physical
meaning of this Lorentz invariance is not clear.
2It may be assumed that the condition that the pressure tensor pij is negative definite
tells something about the ether – that the ether is a material with negative pressure. But
the only reason for naming the tensor field pij “pressure” is that it appears like usual
pressure appears in the usual Euler equation. And this allows to identify pij with usual
pressure only modulo a constant.
3As described by Weinberg [78] “there’s no reason in the world to suppose that the
Lagrangian does not contain all the higher terms with more factors of the curvature and/or
more derivatives, all of which are suppressed”.
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One possibility is that it has none, and it simply as a consequence of
the fact that there are not very much possibilities for quadratic Lagrangians,
therefore, symmetries appear more or less by accident. With another choice
of the constants, especially Xi < 0, we would obtain an SO(4) symmetry,
also without any physical meaning.
Nonetheless, a consequence is that we cannot describe with GET a
Galilean-invariant theory. On the other hand, we can use GET to describe
special-relativistic condensed matter. The reverse method would be to de-
scribe a Galilean invariant theory as the limit Ξ→ 0 of a GET theory.
5.3 Existing research about the similarity
Considering the mentioned problem to obtain a Galilean invariant theory
it is no wonder that the usual Lagrange formalisms for non-relativistic fluid
dynamics in Euler coordinates (as far as considered in Wagner [77]) do not fit
into our scheme. Remarkably, to use the three-dimensional Einstein-Hilbert
Lagrangian to describe dislocations has been proposed by Malyshev [51].
On the other hand, it is widely acknowledged in the condensed matter
community that phonons in various matter move in an effective Lorentz met-
ric gµν which is usually curved. Various aspects have been considered here.
Katanaev and Volovich [43] compare wedge dislocation with cosmic strings.
See also Guenther [35]. A lot of research has been related with the idea of
“dumb holes” – an analog of “black holes” in acoustics. These “dumb holes”
may be used to study quantum gravity effects like Unruh radiation in usual
condensed matter (Unruh [69], Jacobson [40], Rosu [62], Visser [74]).
The most interesting example of usual condensed matter is superfluid
3He. Here not only a curved Lorentz metric has been identified, but also chi-
ral fermions and non-abelian gauge fields (Volovik [76], Jacobson and Volovik
[41]).
Of course, the amount of research which connects condensed matter the-
ory and fundamental field theory is much greater. As noted by Wilczek [79],
“the continuing interchange of ideas between condensed matter and high en-
ergy theory, through the medium of quantum field theory, is a remarkable
phenomenon in itself. A partial list of historically important examples in-
cludes global and local spontaneous symmetry breaking, the renormalization
group, effective field theory, solitons, instantons, and fractional charge and
statistics.”
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6 Comparison with RTG
There is also another theory with almost the same Lagrangian – the “rela-
tivistic theory of gravity” (RTG) proposed by Logunov et al. [49]. In this
theory, we have a Minkowski background metric ηµν . The Lagrangian of
RTG is
L = LRosen + Lmatter(gµν , ψ
m)− m
2
g
16pi
(
1
2
ηµνg
µν√−g −√−g −√−η)
If we identify the Minkowski coordinates in RTG with the preferred coor-
dinates in GET, the Lagrangians are equivalent as functions of gµν for the fol-
lowing choice of constants: Λ = −m2g
2
< 0, Ξ = −η11m2g
2
> 0, Υ = η00
m2g
2
> 0.
In this case, the equations for gµν coincide. The harmonic equation for the
Minkowski coordinates hold in RTG [49]. As a consequence, the equations
of the theories coincide.
Nonetheless, the Euler-Lagrange equations are not all. In above theories
we have additional restrictions related with the notion of causality – causality
conditions. In GET, causality is related with the Newtonian background –
the preferred time T (x) should be a time-like function. This is equivalent
to the condition ρ > 0. In RTG, causality is defined by the Minkowski
background. The light cone of the physical metric gµν should be inside the
light cone of the background metric ηµν .
Once RTG is a special-relativistic theory, it is also incompatible with the
EPR criterion of reality and Bohmian mechanics. This question should be
considered as the most serious difference.
There is also a difference in the quantization concept. RTG suggests
to apply standard quantum field theory on a Minkowski background, while
GET suggests to understand quantum field theory as an effective field theory.
The GET prediction about the cutoff length depends on the interpretation
of g00
√−g as the density of the ether and is not Lorentz-invariant.
RTG has a completely different metaphysical background. Therefore,
RTG has a completely different justification of the Lagrangian. While such
metaphysical differences are often considered to be unimportant in physics,
we do not agree. Metaphysical interpretations and esthetic feelings often
influence preferences for theories. Because the simplicity and beauty of the
explanation of the Einstein equivalence principle is one of the main advan-
tages of GET, this question should not be underestimated.
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7 Comparison with GR with four dark mat-
ter fields
There is also another theory with the same Lagrangian – GR with four scalar
“dark matter fields” Xµ(x)4. Let’s denote it as GRDM. The Lagrangian is
LGRDM = −(8piG)−1γµνXµ,αXν,βgαβ
√−g + LGR(gµν) + Lmatter(gµν , ϕm)
and therefore formally equivalent to GET. But we have completely for-
gotten the physical meaning of the fields Xµ(x) as coordinates. In GRDM,
they are really only scalar fields.
We have to consider here the usual GR energy conditions. They require
the following signs: Υ < 0 and Ξ > 0.
There is another difference between GET and GRDM which is essential
and important to understand. In GET, we have additional global restrictions:
• First, the fields Xµ(x) are global coordinates in GET. In GRDM, there
will be many solutions where the dark matter fields do not define a
global system of coordinates. Moreover, it will be even the typical so-
lution of GRDM. Indeed, solutions which define global coordinates have
unusual boundary conditions. Moreover, complete classes of solutions
are excluded: all solutions with non-trivial topology are forbidden.
• Second, the coordinate T (x) = X0(x) is a global time-like function.
This is equivalent to ρ > 0. Again, a whole class of solutions of GRDM
is excluded: all solutions with closed time-like curves.
• We have also other, unusual boundary conditions for the fields Xµ(x):
their boundary values go to infinity.
These properties do not follow from the Euler-Lagrange equations. In-
stead, we have to remember that the original axioms are axioms about an
ether in a Newtonian space-time. The Lagrange formalism with the “fields”
Xµ(x) is only derived, not fundamental.
Therefore, it is in no way a weakness of GET that the additional global
restrictions do not follow from the GET equations. Instead, this proves
4Kuchar [45] has considered similar scalar fields in GR as “clock fields”.
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additional predictive power of GET in comparison with GRDM. Indeed, if
we observe a solution of GRDM which does not fulfill the additional global
restrictions we have falsified GET, but not GRDM. Thus, in GET we have
additional possibilities for falsification, therefore, higher empirical content.
This difference is of principal, conceptual character – similar global re-
strictions are impossible in general-relativistic theories. Therefore, it helps to
understand the difference between general-relativistic theories and theories
with preferred frame. We consider this question also in appendix B.
8 Comparison with General Relativity
Let’s consider now the differences between the predictions of GET and GR
itself. There are, first, the differences between GET and the variant of GR
with four dark matter fields we have already considered. This restricts GET
to global hyperbolic solutions with trivial topology, moreover, of a special
type – with global harmonic coordinates and global harmonic time-like func-
tion.
8.1 Dark matter and energy conditions
The other part of the difference between GET and GR can be understood
as the difference between GRDM and GR. First, the additional terms define
“dark matter” in the sense that the scalar fields Xµ(x) do not interact with
usual matter.
To understand the most interesting property of this new type of “dark
matter” we have to consider the energy conditions. GET does not yet relate
energy conditions with general properties of the ether. But because GR does
not provide an explanation too, this is unproblematic. We can introduce
them – as in GR – as additional, yet unexplained, properties of the matter
Lagrangian. But if we introduce it in this way, as a property of the matter
fields, the energy conditions do not restrict the sign of Ξ and Υ. Therefore,
without violating the GET version of the energy condition, it is possible to
set Υ > 0. And, because of the interesting predictions which follow from this
choice, we really set Υ > 0.
From point of view of GRDM, this choice violates all energy conditions.
Therefore, GRDM contains a very special, strange type of “dark matter”
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which violates all energy conditions of GR. Therefore, all general theorems
about GR which use various energy conditions fail. Especially the theorems
about big bang and black hole singularities fail.
8.2 Homogeneous universe: no big bang singularity
Let’s consider at first the homogeneous universe solutions of the theory. Be-
cause of the Newtonian background frame, only a flat universe may be ho-
mogeneous. Thus, we make the ansatz:
ds2 = dτ 2 − a2(τ)(dx2 + dy2 + dz2)
Now, we see that in this ansatz the spatial coordinates xi are already
harmonic. It remains to find the harmonic time. The equation for harmonic
time is dT/dτ = 1/a3. The metric in harmonic coordinates is therefore:
ds2 = a6(t)dT 2 − a2(t)δijdX idXj
Note that ρ = g00
√−g = 1, thus, in this ansatz the ether has constant
density, and the universe does not expand. The observable expansion is an
effect of shrinking rulers. In GR this would be only one of the possible
interpretations, without physical importance. Instead, in GET this is the
preferred interpretation because of symmetry reasons. Thus, if the universe
is homogeneous, the universe does not expand, but our rulers are shrinking.
But, as in GR, the global universe looks like expanding.
Below we use standard relativistic language and usual proper time τ (that
means,a˙ = ∂a/∂τ). Using some matter with p = kε we obtain the equations
(8piG = c = 1):
3(a˙/a)2 = −Υ/a6 + 3Ξ/a2 + Λ + ε
2(a¨/a) + (a˙/a)2 = +Υ/a6 + Ξ/a2 + Λ− kε
The Υ-term influences only the early universe, its influence on later uni-
verse may be ignored. But, if we assume Υ > 0, the qualitative behavior of
the early universe changes in a remarkable way. We obtain a lower bound a0
for a(τ) defined by
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Υ/a60 = 3Ξ/a
2
0 + Λ + ε
The solution becomes symmetrical in time. Therefore, before the big
bang there was a big crush, and the whole story can be named big bounce.
For some simple situations, analytical solutions are possible. For example, if
ε = Ξ = 0,Υ > 0,Λ > 0 we have the solution
a(τ) = a0 cosh
1/3(
√
3Λτ)
8.3 Is there independent evidence for inflation theory?
Now, such a big bounce scenario solves the problems of the big bang scenario
with the small horizon. For the description of these problems and their
current solution in inflation theory we follow Primack [60]. There are two
such problems with a small horizon: First, “the angular size today of the
causally connected regions at recombination (p++ e− → H) is only ∆θ ∼ 3o.
Yet the fluctuation in the temperature of the cosmic background radiation
from different regions is very small: ∆T/T ∼ 10−5. How could regions far
out of causal contact have come to temperatures that are so precisely equal?
This is the ‘horizon problem’.” (p.56)
Even more serious seems the following problem: In the standard hot big
bang picture, “the matter that comprises a typical galaxy, for example, first
came into causal contact about a year after the big bang. It is hard to see
how galaxy-size fluctuations could have formed after that, but even harder
to see how they could have formed earlier” (p.8).
Last not least, there is the “flatness problem”. In GR, the assumption
that the universe is flat does not seem to be natural. But for a curved
universe, the initial curvature has to be extremely small in comparison to a
natural dimensionless constant for curvature.
Now, these three problems seem sufficient to rule out the standard Big
Bang model without inflation. But all three problems are solved in GET
without inflation: the two variants of the horizon problem are solved because
the horizon in a universe with big bounce is much larger, if not infinite. And
the flat universe is certainly preferred as the only homogeneous universe,
therefore, there is no flatness problem.
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Therefore, it seems reasonable to question the necessity for inflation in
GET cosmology. There are some other problems solved by inflation: that it
“dilutes any preceding density of monopoles or other unwanted relics”, and
predictions about a “nearly constant curvature spectrum δH = constant of
adiabatic fluctuations” (p.59). If these will be serious problems for a GET
universe without inflation is hard to say. If such “relics” are really necessary
because of particle theoretical reasons, it seems possible to use a large enough
Υ. Then the critical temperature which causes the creation of the various
“relics” may not be reached during the Big Bounce. What GET allows to
predict about the spectrum of adiabatic fluctuation will be a question for
future research, but it seems not unreasonable to assume that the simplest
imaginable spectrum – the constant one – may be compatible with GET.
Another question is if inflation is a necessary consequence of particle
theory. This seems to be not the case. To obtain inflation, we have to make
non-trivial assumptions about this phase transition.5 Particle theory does
not give independent evidence in favor of inflation. Thus, it seems that GET
cosmology with Υ > 0 is a viable theory without inflation, while GR requires
inflation.
The existing evidence for a hot state of the universe may be used to obtain
upper bounds for Υ.
5“In the first inflationary models, the dynamics of the very early universe was typ-
ically controlled by the self-energy of the Higgs field associated with the breaking of
a Grand Unified Theory (GUT) into the standard 3-2-1 model: GUT → SU(3)color ⊗
[SU(2)⊗ U(1)]electroweak. ... Guth (1981) initially considered a scheme in which inflation
occurs while the universe is trapped in an unstable state (with the GUT unbroken) on
the wrong side of a maximum in the Higgs potential. This turns out not to work ... The
solution in the ‘new inflation’ scheme ... is for inflation to occur after barrier penetration
(if any). It is necessary that the potential of the scalar field controlling inflation (‘inflaton’)
be nearly flat (i.e. decrease very slowly with increasing inflaton field) for the inflationary
period to last long enough. This nearly flat part of the potential must then be followed
by a very steep minimum, in order that the energy contained in the Higgs potential be
rapidly shared with the other degrees of freedom (‘reheating’). A more general approach,
‘chaotic’ inflation, has been worked out ... However, ... it is necessary that the inflaton
self-coupling be very small ... This requirement prevents the Higgs field from being the
inflaton.” [60], p. 57. This consideration suggests that inflation is in no way a necessary
consequence of the phase transition related with a GUT.
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8.4 A new dark matter term
The influence of the Ξ-term on the age of the universe is easy to understand.
For Ξ > 0 it behaves like homogeneously distributed dark matter with p =
−(1/3)ε. It influences the age of the universe. A similar influence on the age
of the universe has a non-zero curvature in GR cosmology.
It seems not unreasonable that a non-zero value for Ξ may be part of the
solution of the dark matter problem. According to Primack [60], there seems
to be a large amount of “cold dark matter” (CDM), but this is not sufficient
to fit the data. The models favored in this paper have some additional
homogeneous component: some “hot dark matter” part (CHDM) or a non-
zero cosmological constant (ΛCDM). Now, the “dark matter” term proposed
here is also homogeneous, and something between homogeneous “hot dark
matter” and a cosmological constant.
Thus, the Ξ-term defines a reasonable candidate for dark matter. Current
observation seems to favor Ξ > 0.
8.5 Stable frozen stars instead of black holes
Let’s consider now spherical symmetric stable solutions. Of course, for sym-
metry reasons, we want to have static preferred coordinates too. For the
preferred coordinates X i the metric should be harmonic. Of course, we de-
scribe this metric using the “preferred radius” r =
√
δijX iXj. Fortunately,
there is a simple general formula for the harmonic metric. For a given func-
tion m(r), 0 < m < r, the metric
ds2 = (1− m∂m/∂r
r
)(
r −m
r +m
dt2 − r +m
r −mdr
2)− (r +m)2dΩ2
is harmonic in X i. For constant m, this formula reduces to the
Schwarzschild metric in harmonic coordinates. Therefore, m(r) defines the
(harmonic) Schwarzschild radius of the mass inside the radius r.
Now this general solution of the harmonic equation may be used to con-
struct various partial solutions for special matter equations. We start with
an arbitrary distribution of mass m(r) with 0 < m < r, ∂m/∂r ≥ 0. The
Einstein equations define ε(r) and p(r), and we obtain a solution for some
material law which depends on the radius: p = k(r)ε. As a simple example,
let’s consider the ansatz m(r) = (1−∆)r. We obtain
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ds2 = ∆2dt2 − (2−∆)2(dr2 + r2dΩ2)
0 = −Υ∆−2 + 3Ξ(2−∆)−2 + Λ + ε
0 = +Υ∆−2 + Ξ(2−∆)−2 + Λ− p
Now, in GR we obtain only the trivial solution ε = p = 0. Once the
cosmological constants are sufficiently small, nothing changes for moderate
values of ∆. But for sufficiently small ∆ ≪ 1 the situation changes – we
obtain a stable solution p = ε = Υ∆−2. This is a stable star with a radius
very close to the Schwarzschild radius, with time dilation ∆−1 =
√
ε/Υ ∼
M−1 for a frozen star of mass M.
It is seems obvious that this is not a special property of this solution,
but a rather general effect. Even a very small Υ-term becomes important
close enough to the horizon size and allows to obtain stable solutions. For
a collapsing star this term defines a counter-force which stops the collapse
immediately before horizon formation and leads to a subsequent explosion.
This explosion does not follow immediately, because near the bounce the
movement is time-dilated too.
Thus, we obtain very interesting differences for the gravitational collapse.
For the outside observer, we can fit the GR predictions making Υ small
enough. But even for arbitrary small Υ > 0 we have remarkable qualitative
differences – there is no region “behind the horizon”, no singularity, and
every infalling observer can observe this difference.
9 General-relativistic quantization problems
The quantization of gravity is usually considered as one of the major prob-
lems of fundamental physics. But, it seems, this problem should be named
instead “quantization of general relativity”. Indeed, Butterfield and Isham
[20] note that “... most workers would agree on the following ... diagnosis of
what is at the root of most of the conceptual problems of quantum gravity.
Namely: general relativity is not just a theory of the gravitational field –
in an appropriate sense, it is also a theory of spacetime itself; and hence a
theory of quantum gravity must have something to say about the quantum
nature of space and time.”
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Now, in GET the theory of gravity is not a theory of space-time itself,
instead, it is a theory of a medium in a classical Newtonian space-time.
This problem is, obviously, much easier – the most serious problems simply
disappear. On the other hand, it is much less interesting – we do not learn
anything new about “the quantum nature of space and time”, instead, the
classical Newtonian space-time defines the fixed stage for quantization. While
the Newtonian background is very simple, it is also not very interesting and
remains as unexplained as in Newton’s theory. The really hard, conceptual,
interesting problems of relativistic quantum gravity disappear into nothing.
What remains seem to be only a few technical problems as complex as the
quantization of usual condensed matter.
Once these conceptual problems disappear, they can be considered as
additional fundamental support for GET and are therefore worth to be con-
sidered in this context. In appendix D we consider in more detail a problem
related with superposition of gravitational fields which I have named the
“scalar product problem”. This problem has several nice properties: it sug-
gests a simple solution – a fixed space-time background which is common for
different gravitational fields. Moreover, it is based on an interesting quantum
observable – a transition probability. And this transition probability may be
computed in the non-relativistic limit – multi-particle Schro¨dinger theory.
The notorious “problem of time” is mainly a conceptual problem. It
appears if we make a deliberate theoretical decision: that the time measured
with clocks – the time of general relativity – has to be unified with the notion
of time of quantum mechanics. We discuss these metaphysical questions in
§ C.
Nonetheless, some other well-known problems of quantum GR which do
not exist in quantum GET are also worth to be considered: the problem of
causality, and the information loss problem.
9.1 Causality
The problem of time is also closely related with causality: “General relativity
accustoms us to the ideas that (i) the causal structure of spacetime depends
on the metric ... and (ii) the metric and causal structure are influenced
by matter ... In general relativity, these ideas are ‘kept under control’ in
the sense that in each model, there is of course a single metric tensor gµν ,
representing a single metric and causal structure. But once we embark on
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constructing a quantum theory of gravity, we expect some sort of quantum
fluctuations in the metric, and so also in the causal structure. But in this
case, how are we to formulate a quantum theory with a fluctuating causal
structure?” [20]
This conceptual problem has also technical aspects. “For example, a
quantum scalar field satisfies the micro-causal commutation relations
[
φˆ(X), φˆ(Y )
]
= 0
whereby fields evaluated at space-like separated spacetime points com-
mute. However, the concept of two points being space-like separated has
no meaning if the spacetime metric is probabilistic or phenomenological. In
the former case, the most likely scenario is that [the commutator] never van-
ishes, thereby removing one of the foundations of conventional quantum field
theory.”
9.2 Information loss problem
Another problem which disappears is the “information loss problem” pro-
posed by Hawking [38]. The problem is that the black hole contains informa-
tion. But the Hawking radiation cannot take away this information because
it is determined only by the geometry of the black hole outside the horizon,
and the black hole has no hair that records any detailed information about
the collapsing body. The key constraint comes from causality – once the
collapsing body is behind the horizon, it is incapable of influencing the radi-
ation. Now, suppose the black hole evaporates. That means, the black hole
has been replaced by the radiation completely. It is a familiar fact of life
that information is often lost in practice. But here the information is lost in
principle. It seems that an initially pure state becomes after evaporation a
mixed state. And this is in contradiction with the fundamental principles of
quantum mechanics.
Preskill [58] in a review of the problem writes that initially he “was in-
clined to dismiss Hawking’s proposal as an unwarranted extrapolation from
an untrustworthy approximation”. But as “I have pondered this puzzle, it
has come to seem less and less likely to me that the accepted principles of
quantum mechanics and relativity can be reconciled with the phenomenon
of black hole evaporation.”
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Now, it is hard for me to judge about the seriousness of this problem.
Personally I’m convinced that the correct black hole evaporation scenario
in GR is different from the usually accepted one. In my opinion it is the
scenario of black hole evaporation proposed by Gerlach [32]. In this scenario,
no black hole horizon is formed. As far as I understand, relativists do not
like this scenario because it seems to prefer the coordinates of the outside
observer. But I don’t think this argument is justified – the preference is
predefined by the preference for the Minkowski vacuum state in the initial
situation before the collapse. In Gerlach’s scenario we have no information
loss problem because no horizon is formed.
Anyway, in GET the information loss problem disappears together with
the black holes. We have stable frozen stars which do not radiate Hawking
radiation once they have reached a stable state. We also have not to be afraid
of some similar situations – there is always a global absolute time, and this
global time has to be used in quantum GET to define an unitary evolution.
10 Atomic ether theory
With the Newtonian background only the conceptual problems related with
relativistic space-time quantization disappear. The problem with non-re-
normalizability remains. But there is a natural solution for this problem in
the context of a condensed matter theory – an atomic hypothesis. Therefore,
we assume that our medium has an atomic structure. This leads to an explicit
cutoff. The regularization becomes physical. The concept of gravity as an
effective field theory is well-known and goes back to Sakharov [65]. 6
One property of this widely accepted effective field theory picture is that
it makes a certain assumption about the cutoff length. It is assumed to be
the Planck length aP ≃ 10−33cm. This property has even used to name this
concept: “Planck ether”, “Planck solid” [42] or “Planck condensed matter”
[76]. But this is de facto the only property of the “Planck ether” which is
known. 7
6Jegerlehner notes that ideas that “the relationship between bare and renormalizes
parameters obtains a physical meaning ... are quite old and in some aspects are now com-
monly accepted among particle physicists” [42]. Weinberg describes this as “the present
educated view on the standard model, and of general relativity, ... that these are leading
terms in effective field theories” [78].
7“The curvature of space-time is relevant and special relativity is modified by gravita-
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The “atomic ether hypothesis” differs from this concept in everything
except the fact that current field theory should be replaced by another one
below some cutoff. First, a well-defined space-time concept has been fixed
– the classical Newtonian background with Euclidean space, absolute time
and classical causality. Moreover we have well-defined conservation laws. We
have also fixed the quantization concept – classical canonical quantization for
a theory with a discrete number of steps of freedom. Momentum quantization
is part of this concept. Moreover, the number of ether atoms will not vary
in this scheme too. Thus, we fix an extremely simple, very special class of
underlying microscopic theories. 8
Another property of atomic ether theory is especially interesting: the
interpretation of the “ether density” ρ = g00
√−g as the number of “ether
atoms” per volume. This leads to an interesting prediction for the cutoff:
ρ(x)Vcutoff = 1.
The point is that this prediction is different from the usual Planck length
aP . This can be illustrated with the example of the “homogeneous universe”
solution (see § 8.2). In this solution, ρ remains constant in time. Therefore,
the cutoff length remains constant in time too. On the other hand, our rulers
shrink. Thus, the cutoff length is not constant in our cm scale, it cannot be
the Planck length. From point of view of our rulers, the cutoff length is
expanding. For Υ < 0 or small enough Υ the cutoff was below Planck scale
in the past, for Λ > 0 or small enough Λ it will be greater than Planck scale,
but even greater than the cm scale, in future. Thus, in this case we will be
able to observe in a far away cosmological future the effects of the atomic
ether.
tional effects. One expects a world which exhibits an intrinsic cutoff corresponding to the
fundamental length aP ≃ 10−33cm. But not only Poincare invariance may break down,
also the laws of quantum mechanics need not hold any longer at ΛP .” [42]
8It may be argued that we are unable to do experiments in this domain, therefore, it is
also unreasonable to make a hypothesis about nature in this domain. All we can do is to
describe their universality class. Nonetheless, even if we are unable to do experiments, we
can use general principles as Ockham’s razor to make a choice. Moreover, there is no need
to make a definite choice. A situation where we have several metaphysically completely
different models which are all in ideal agreement with experiment would be satisfactory
too – it gives a clear account about the boundaries of scientific research.
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11 Canonical atomic ether quantization
Ether theory suggests to solve the ultraviolet problems with explicit, physical
regularization, based on the idea of an atomic ether. This idea leads to the
following canonical atomic ether quantization scheme:
1. First, we need the full continuous ether theory, that means, a continu-
ous “theory of everything” (TOE) which describes the complete ether.
This in no way implies that we need some “grand unification” to ob-
tain this TOE. There is no requirement that there should be only one
unified force. We can as well try to start with GET + SM.
2. Then, we have to find an atomic ether model which gives the TOE in the
large scale limit. There are obviously many of them, because the large
scale limit fixes only the universality class. This uncertainty remains as
long as there is no experimental evidence in the short distance domain.
Therefore simple standard models would be sufficient.
The possibly critical problem is to prove that the large scale limit of
the discrete model is indeed the original theory.
3. Then, this classical atomic ether theory has to be quantized in the
canonical way. If the atomic model is close enough to usual atomic
models of usual condensed matter, this step will be unproblematic.
Note that in this case we can apply also Bohmian mechanics. Once
this step has been finished, we have quantized gravity.
4. Now, for actual quantum computations it is necessary to derive the
large scale limit of the quantum atomic ether theory, which will be
quantum field theory.
Note that this step is already purely phenomenological and not nec-
essary for the theory itself. That mean, problems which appear in
this last step are problems of large scale approximations in classical
quantum theory, but not fundamental problems of quantum gravity.
Now, for this quantization program we have to distinguish different prob-
lems. The first problem is if this scheme works at all. Here, we are in a very
good situation. We have an example in reality where the the whole quanti-
zation scheme is realized – superfluid 3He−A. In the theory of 3He−A, we
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obtain in the large scale limit the most important ingredients of the current
standard model. Volovik writes: “In this sense the superfluid phases of 3He,
especially 3He− A, are of most importance: the low-energy degrees of free-
dom in 3He−A do really consist of chiral fermions, gauge fields and gravity”
[76]. Thus, if we do not have an (uncommon among physicists) desire for
mathematical rigor, for at least one field theory with gravity, fermions and
gauge fields an atomic ether quantization scheme works. Moreover, it works
in reality.
This is very important – the existence of such a model in reality gives
certainty that the program may be realized, and it provides suggestions how
this has to be done.
11.1 Regularization using a moving grid
Let’s see how this works on the example of our second step – the derivation
of an atomic model for a given continuous ether theory.
Without the ether interpretation, it would be natural to try to regularize
the theory with a regular lattice, following lattice gauge theory. Based on
the space-time interpretation, we would try to develop a discrete variant of
geometry – something like the Regge calculus or dynamical triangulations
[50].
The ether interpretation suggests something different – a discretization
which remains as close as possible to the real atomic grid. That means, we
do not have to use a regular, static lattice. Instead, we have to use a grid
with the following properties:
• The grid node density is the “ether density” ρ:
∑
xk∈V
1 ≈
∫
V
ρd3x
• The grid moves, with “ether velocity” vi(xk);
Without additional information about the other material properties of
the ether we cannot say anything reasonable about their discretization. But
in the case of the Minkowski space-time, this prescription reduces to a ho-
mogeneous, static grid. Therefore, we can use the lectures of lattice gauge
theory [36] to understand how to discretize them.
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Let’s consider shortly some details: as a first step to obtain an atomic
model we have to switch from Euler (local) coordinates to Lagrange (mate-
rial) coordinates. Once GET is defined by a Lagrange formalism, the first
interesting problem is if this transformation is possible in the Lagrange or
Hamilton formalism too. This is known to be possible in hydrodynamics. In
the Hamilton formalism this can be done with a canonical transformation
[19], [64], [34]. In the following we assume that this is possible in GET too.
The next important step is the discretization. Here, it is useful to have
in mind that we want to quantize the theory later. Therefore, to be able to
use canonical quantization, we need a Lagrange or Hamilton formalism for
the discrete theory. For this purpose, it is not reasonable to discretize the
equations them-self. Instead, it is much more reasonable to discretize the
Lagrange function and to define the discrete equations as Euler-Lagrange
equations for the discrete Lagrangian.
The usual method to obtain a discrete function on a grid is the finite
element method. In this method, we define functions on the grid as a sub-
space of the space of all functions. In the simplest case, this is the space
of piecewise linear function on the simplices. These functions are uniquely
defined by their function values on the grid nodes: f(xk) = fk. This defines
an embedding of the grid functions into the space of all functions. In the
other direction, we can use orthogonal projection of this subspace to define
the discrete image of a continuous function. Thus, the function values in the
nodes fk are not defined by the function values of the original continuous
functions, but by integral formulas: fk =
∫
f(x)χk(x)dx, where χk(x) is the
piecewise linear function defined by χk(xl) = δkl.
In our case, we have an interesting modification of this method: the
density ρ(x) should not be described by a variable grid function ρi. Instead,
an integral containing ρ should be interpolated on the grid in another way.
The simplest way would be∫
A
f(x)ρ(x)dx→
∑
xk∈A
fk
Therefore, in the discrete Lagrange formalism the density simply disap-
pears. Now, there are various variants of this method, and which is the best
one depends on the material properties of the ether. Therefore, further spec-
ification of the scheme in this general context does not seem to be justified
and has to be left to future research.
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11.2 Constraints and conservation laws in a moving
grid
Now, it is reasonable to ask about the advantage of this type of discretization,
for example in comparison with a regular, static lattice. As far, the only
argument was that this looks more natural from point of view of the atomic
ether interpretation.
But, if we look at the remaining problems, we observe that they become
essentially simplified. Indeed, once we have a well-defined discrete Lagrange
formalism, the most serious remaining quantization problem are constraints.
Unfortunately, without specification of the material properties we cannot say
anything about possible constraints related with these material properties.
But there are well-known constraints in GR, and as we have seen in § 3.2,
they remain to be constraints in GET. Moreover, the conservation laws them-
self are constraints too.
Now, these constraints essentially change their character. The continuity
equation simply disappears. It is no longer an equation of the discrete theory.
The density ρ is no longer part of the equations. Instead, the continuity
equation becomes a tautology – the number of grid nodes remains constant.
Moreover, the Euler equations become second order equations: the first order
derivative of g0i
√−g becomes a second order derivative of the grid node
position:
∂t(g
0i
√−g) = ∂t(ρvi)→ mx¨i
Moreover, we have seen in § 3.2 that the other constraints also may be
explained by the requirement that there are no second order equations for ρ
and ρvi.
Therefore, the constraint problem essentially simplifies. Closely related
with the constraints is the question how the conservation laws are realized.
The conservation of ether particles in this approach is realized automatically,
as the conservation of the number of grid nodes. Therefore, we have no
“quantum fluctuations” of the ether particle number.
Note that this property holds in the fundamental, atomic ether theory.
We do not make any claim about the large scale quantum field theory approx-
imation and the behavior of a field operator ρˆ(x) which fulfills an operator
version of the continuity equation. This approximation is nothing we have
to care as long as we consider fundamental questions.
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11.3 Universality
Now, considering the previously discussed program, it seems to suggest that
almost every ether theory may be quantized in this way. But a completely
different question is how a typical ether theory looks like. For this question,
the consideration of long distance universality is important.
The first point of long distance universality is that very different atomic
theories can have the same large scale limit. “Long distance universality is
a well-known phenomenon from condensed matter physics, where we know
that a ferromagnet, a liquid-gas system and a super-conductor may exhibit
identical long range properties (phase diagram, critical exponents, etc.)” [42].
This point is important for the justification of the “moving grid” method
– it suggests that it is not very meaningful to search for the “true” atomic
theory without experimental evidence in this domain. All we can do is to
search for a theory which is sufficiently simple and natural in comparison with
their competitors. Even without experimental evidence Ockham’s razor may
be used to choose between theories.
The other side of large scale universality is that the theories which appear
as large scale approximations have some very typical properties. Existing
research in this domain has already given important and interesting results:
“The extraction of the leading low energy asymptote is equivalent to the
requirement of renormalizability of S-matrix elements, and this has been
shown to be necessarily be a non-Abelian gauge theory which must have
undergone a Higgs mechanism if the gauge bosons are not strictly massless.
... only a renormalizable field theory can survive as a tail, the possible
renormalizable theories on the other hand are known and are easy to classify”
[42].
At a first look, this seems to be in conflict with our atomic ether quanti-
zation scheme. There seems to be no point where similar restrictions appear.
But there is no contradiction – these are simply different questions. One
question is if a quantization in this way is possible in principle. Another
question is if a theory has the typical properties of a large scale limit of an
atomic ether theory. The answer for the first question may be very well a
positive one, but the related atomic ether theory may require a very strange
conspiracy of their coefficients.
But, if we have seen, for the basic ingredients of the SM – fermions and
gauge fields – the situation is very nice. It is well understood in theory why
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such renormalizable theories appear as large scale limits of a typical atomic
ether theory, and we have observed them in reality in condensed matter, in
3He− A.
Considering all these facts, it seems likely that this scheme works, and
that problems which appear on this way may be solved. Instead, the problem
of canonical GR quantization we discuss in § D suggests that a quantization
without a fixed background fails in principle.
12 Comparison with canonical quantization
of general relativity
It is interesting to compare our canonical program for GET quantization
with the real way of development of quantization programs for general rela-
tivity, especially the canonical program. The point is that the progress of the
canonical quantization program is much more in agreement with ether phi-
losophy than with general relativistic philosophy. Let’s consider the different
steps in the standard canonical quantization approach:
12.1 ADM formalism
The ADM decomposition [1] is essentially the decomposition of gµν into
ρ, vi, pij. Therefore, it is an essential part of the GET approach.
This decomposition is in obvious disagreement with relativistic philoso-
phy. Space and time are no longer considered as a unit, they are separated.
We have a special time coordinate t(x). Moreover, the general spacetime
manifold becomes subdivided into a product S ⊗ R, that means, changes of
topology in time are excluded. This modification of relativistic metaphysics
is so important that the ADM formalism is often considered as a different in-
terpretation of general relativity – geometrodynamics. In this interpretation,
GR no longer describes a spacetime, but the evolution of three-dimensional
geometries.
Of course, the Hamilton formalism of general relativity and that of ether
theory remain quite different. In GET, the Hamiltonian is not a constraint.
We have equations for the preferred coordinate T (x) used to define the folia-
tion. And we have additional physical steps of freedom: density and velocity
of the ether.
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12.2 Tetrad and triad formalism
The next important step is the introduction of the tetrad formalism. In this
formalism, the metric gµν becomes derived. We have a tetrad field – four
vector fields eµa(x) which form an orthonormal basis in each point, so that
gµν = eµae
ν
bη
ab.
This is necessary for the incorporation of fermions into general relativity.
Obviously this step is also a gross violation of relativistic ideology. Indeed,
according to this ideology the field gµν has already a fundamental interpre-
tation, it defines spacetime. The other argument in favor of this procedure
is that GR becomes a gauge theory, with the gauge group SO(3,1).
The next step on this way is the combination of above approaches: The
time coordinate of the ADM composition is used to fix the time-like tetrad
vector. After this “time gauge” we have a triad – three vector fields in space,
with compact gauge group SO(3). The technical problems with non-compact
gauge groups are a main argument for this choice.
Now, a triad field looks very natural from point of view of ether theory.
If we imagine the ether as a crystal, the three triad vector fields may be
considered as defining locally the orientation of the crystal structure. Thus,
to introduce triad variables may be an interesting possibility for canonical
GET quantization. Of course, as in the case of the ADM variables, we cannot
take the formulas as they are, because we have a different Hamiltonian and
different steps of freedom.
Instead, to consider this triad formalism as something natural from point
of view of relativistic ideology seems impossible.
12.3 Ashtekar variables
The next step is a canonical transformation to Ashtekar variables [4] which
simplifies the constraints. There are two variants of the Ashtekar formalism:
the first was a complex formalism. In this complex formalism, an additional
simplification of the Hamiltonian constraint happens. For this advantage it is
necessary to pay with the problem of “reality conditions”. But the problem
with these reality conditions was too hard, that’s why following Barbero [8]
the real version of the Ashtekar formalism is preferred now. This seems to
be a good idea from point of view of the ether approach – the real variant
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of the formalism clearly better fits into ether ideology in comparison with a
complex formalism.
The physical meaning of the Ashtekar variables is not obvious at all in
the relativistic approach. On the other hand, we already know that we
have to do something similar, with similar results, but with clear physical
interpretation in canonical ether quantization: the transformation from Euler
to Lagrange coordinates. As we have already mentioned, this is a canonical
transformation, and it results in a simplification of the constraints.
12.4 Discrete models of geometry
An important part of existing attempts to quantize gravity are discrete mod-
els. In some sense, discrete models are also not in ideal fit with classical
spacetime ideology. It would be much more natural to have a continuous
spacetime for all distances. But the problems with non-renormalizability
suggest to use discrete regularizations.
On the other hand, the consideration of discrete models is a natural part of
canonical ether quantization, with clear physical motivation: an atomic ether
theory. Of course, the grids used in ether theory are three-dimensional grids
in a standard Newtonian space, moving in continuous time. The position of
the grid nodes are steps of freedom of the ether. These steps of freedom do
not exist in the purely geometrical approaches. Nonetheless, we can learn
from these approaches how to discretize the geometric steps of freedom.
For example, it seems quite natural to use the basic ideas of Regge calculus
[61] to discretize the pressure pij . We obtain a discretization where the
pressure pij is described by a scalar on each edge between neighbor nodes.
This discretization has a natural interpretation as the force between neighbor
atoms.
12.5 Summary
The interesting observation is that, while searching for a way to quantize
general relativity, most success has been reached in a direction which is in
no way close to standard GR ideology:
• introduction of a preferred time and a Hamilton formalism;
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• introduction of other variables so that the metric gµν no longer funda-
mental;
• canonical transformations to simplify the constraints;
• discretization of the theory;
Instead, all these steps are quite natural in the ether approach. We have
formulated most of them in our canonical ether quantization program. The
steps of freedom in GET are different from the steps of freedom in canonical
GR, and the formulas for the GET approach have yet to be worked out.
Nonetheless, our observation suggests that the canonical ether quantization
concept is on the right way.
13 Quantum field theory
Now, the question how to quantize an ether theory is conceptually completely
different from the quantization of GR. The main question we want to consider
here is if this leads to differences in semi-classical QFT.
In principle, the way we have to quantize continuous ether theory is to
quantize a discrete atomic ether model in a canonical way and then to con-
sider the large scale limit. Thus, we have to quantize gravity similar to the
quantization of hydrodynamics by extrapolation of the microscopic theory,
as done by Landau [47]. But it has been found (Davydov [25]) that the same
result may be obtained by canonical quantization, without using microscopic
theory. Therefore, without having reasonable microscopic models, it is rea-
sonable to apply canonical quantization to the continuous GET equations.
To consider microscopic models seems necessary only for a better under-
standing of the way we have to regularize the infinities. For example, we can
learn why the renormalization of the vacuum energy is justified. This can be
seen using superfluid 3He as a model (Volovik [76]).
Once we use canonical quantization, it is no wonder that we obtain the
same formulas as usual in quantum field theory. Nonetheless, some remarks
seem to be interesting.
First, even if in our covariant formulation the preferred coordinates for-
mally appear as fields Xµ(x), this does not mean that they should be quan-
tized as scalar fields. This would be a serious misunderstanding about the
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purpose of the covariant formulation. Instead, the Xµ remain classical pre-
ferred coordinates. This is an immediate consequence of the basic idea for
quantization: to quantize a microscopic atomic model in a canonical way,
using classical Schro¨dinger theory.
13.1 Semi-classical quantization of a scalar field
Let’s consider as an example the canonical quantization of a scalar field on
a classical GET background. We have the Lagrangian
L = 1
2
√−g(gµνφ,µφ,ν −m2φ2)
We have a well-defined preferred frame defined by the coordinates Xµ,
and we quantize the field in this frame. Note that canonical quantization is a
very artificial procedure from point of view of general relativity - it destroys
its covariance ideology. Instead, it is a very natural procedure from point of
view of ether theory. Using the standard formalism of canonical quantization,
we obtain
pi =
∂L
∂φ,0
= gˆ0µφ,µ
H = piφ,0 −L = 1
2
(gˆ00)−1(pi − gˆ0iφ,i)2 − 1
2
gˆijφ,iφ,j +
m2
2
φ2
√−g
Note that these expressions look beautiful in the original ether variables
too:
pi = ρφ,0 + ρv
iφ,i
H = 1
2
(ρ−1pi2 − 2piviφ,i − pijφ,iφ,j) + m
2
2
φ2
√
−ρ|pij |
As we see, our ADM-like decomposition is in good agreement with the
canonical formalism. We define now φ and pi as operators with the standard
commutation rules (~ = 1):
[φ(x), pi(y)] = iδ(x− y)
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As we see, this definition does not depend on the gravitational field. This
is an important observation. The background space, its affine symmetry, the
related Hilbert space for the field φ(x), the commutation relations and the
algebra of observables on this Hilbert space do not depend on the gravita-
tional field. This does not seem to be important in semi-classical theory,
but it becomes very important if we consider superpositions of gravitational
fields (see appendix D). In this case, the definition of the Hilbert space
may be used as it is, and scalar products between states defined for different
gravitational fields are well-defined.
This is a very important difference between quantization of GR and GET.
In GR, the spacetime points and therefore the Hilbert spaces for the fields
ϕ(x) have no independent meaning.
13.2 Particle operators and vacuum state
One of the main lectures of quantum field theory is that the fundamental
object are the fields, not the particles. The notion of particles is derived,
secondary. 9 GET does not question this insight. Instead, in the canonical
GET quantization scheme this becomes exceptionally obvious. The classical
continuous ether is described by continuous fields – properties of the ether.
The fields are fundamental. Their description does not depend on the gravi-
tational field – as we have seen, the Hilbert space for the quantum field ϕ(x)
is defined independent of the gravitational field. On the other hand, the no-
tion of particles and the vacuum state do not appear in a gravity-independent
way. For the vacuum state we have a natural definition: it is the state with
minimal energy. But the Hamilton operator depends on the gravitational
field, therefore, the definition of the vacuum state and the notion of particles
too. In the case of a constant metric gµν particle operators are defined by
the formulas:
9“In its mature form, the idea of quantum field theory is that quantum fields are the
basis ingredients of the universe, and particles are just bundles of energy and momentum
of the fields” [78]. What “quantum field theory uniquely explains is the existence of
different, yet indistinguishable, copies of elementary particles. Two electrons anywhere in
the Universe, whatever their origin and history, are observed to have exactly the same
properties. We understand this as a consequence of the fact that both are excitations of
the same underlying ur-stuff, the electron field. The electron field is thus the primary
reality” [79].
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φk =
∫
eikxφ(x)dx
pik =
∫
eikxpi(x)dx
a+k =
1√
2ωk
(pik − i(gˆ0iki − ωk)φk),
ak =
1√
2ωk
(pik − i(gˆ0iki + ωk)φk),
ω2k = gˆ
00(−gˆijkikj +m2
√−g)
with
H =
∫
Hdx = 1
2
∫
pi2k + ω
2
kφ
2
kdk
[ak, H ] = ωkak
ak|0〉 = 0
Now, in the case of a non-trivial gravitational field, these particle states
are no longer eigenstates of the the Hamilton operator. They interact with
the gravitational field. Nonetheless, they remain to be an approximation.
We can introduce wave packets:
φkx =
∫
eiky−σ(y−x)
2
φ(y)dy
pikx =
∫
eiky−σ(y−x)
2
pi(y)dy
a+kx =
1√
2ωkx
(pikx − i(gˆ0iki − ωkx)φkx)
akx =
1√
2ωkx
(pikx − i(gˆ0iki + ωkx)φkx)
ω2kx = gˆ
00(−gˆijkikj +m2
√−g)
We obtain
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[akx, H ] ≈ ωkxakx
akx|0〉 ≈ 0
Here the vacuum state |0〉 remains to be defined as the state with min-
imal energy, it’s expression using the local particle operators becomes an
approximation.
This local definition of particle is useful for comparison with existing
semi-classical field theory (cf. [13]). In this theory, we have the problem
how to define the vacuum state and the Fock space. It is usually solved by
definition of a set of observers. For these observers, the vacuum state is the
state where they do not observe particles.
Now, a similar problem does not appear in our canonical scheme. for
our scalar field we have a natural choice – the vacuum state as the state
with minimal energy. But this choice may be understood in a similar way
as the definition of a set of preferred observers – the observers which are in
rest compared with the preferred frame. Now, our local particle operators
may be interpreted as the particle operators which are important for the
local observers and their particle detectors. In the vacuum state they do not
observe particles. Therefore, our definition of the vacuum is in agreement
with the definition of the vacuum state related with the set of preferred
observers which are in rest.
13.3 Different representations
The major technical problem in quantum field theory on a curved background
(M, gµν) is the existence of infinitely many unitarily inequivalent representa-
tions of the canonical commutation relations. Isham [39] describes it in the
following way: “The real problems arise if one is presented with a generic
metric gµν , in which case it is not at all clear how to proceed. A minimum re-
quirement is that the Hamiltonians H(t), or the Hamiltonian densities should
be well-defined. However, there is an unpleasant possibility that the repre-
sentations could be t dependent, and in such a way that those corresponding
to different values of t are unitarily inequivalent, in which case the dynamical
equations are not meaningful.”
Now, GET gives all what may be wanted to prove that this does not
happen: we have a simple equation for the metric (the harmonic equation),
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conservation of some important quantities (ether mass and momentum), we
can use inequalities for ρ and p of type ε < ρ < R (which may be interpreted
as boundaries for the validity of GET) if necessary. Possibly this will be
sufficient to solve this technical problem.
On the other hand, this problem appears also in thermodynamics for
states with different temperature – something which in reality sometimes
changes in time. Therefore it would not be strange if the problem nonetheless
remains. I consider it to be an artifact of the limit lcutoff → 0.
13.4 Gauge field quantization
Let’s consider now questions related with the quantization of gauge fields, at
first the simplest case of QED in flat space. There are different well-known
quantization schemes which may be used to incorporate the gauge condition.
In the variant of Bjorken and Drell [14] the gauge condition (Coulomb gauge)
is incorporated into the configuration space:
[A˙i(x, t), Aj(x
′, t)] = −iδtrij (x− x′)
The other possibility is to consider a large configuration space
[A˙µ(x, t), Aν(x
′, t)] = −iδµνδ(x− x′)
and to incorporate the gauge condition as an additional restriction for
the states:
(∂µAµ(x))+|Φ〉 = 0
This scheme leads to a problem with the interpretation of the particle
operators. We have
[ckµc
†
k′ν ] = ηµνδk − k′
therefore the role of ck0 is reversed: ck0 behaves like c
†
kj. Now, there are
two variants of the interpretation of these commutation relations. In the
first, classical, Fermi-Dirac quantization [29], [26] we accept that the Lorentz
symmetry is broken in the large space: the vacuum is defined by
c†k0|Φ0〉 = cki|Φ0〉 = 0
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In the other, explicitly relativistic variant introduced by Gupta and
Bleuler [36], [15] we define the vacuum in the invariant way
ckµ|Φ0〉 = 0
and obtain an indefinite Hilbert space:
〈Φ0|ck0c†k0|Φ0〉 < 0
Again, we have a conflict between relativistic symmetry and a fundamen-
tal physical principle – the definiteness of the Hilbert space. Of course, it
is well-known that these differences do not lead to observable differences.
Nonetheless, this particular quantization problem is further illustration of
the general picture we have found in Bohmian mechanics as well as for the
local energy and momentum of the gravitational field: every more fundamen-
tal description requires to break relativistic symmetry. It is obvious that in
this case we prefer the definite Hilbert space. Therefore, GET suggests to re-
ject the Gupta-Bleuler approach and to use, instead, the older, non-covariant
Fermi-Dirac quantization scheme.
The choice between Fermi-Dirac quantization and the scheme used by
Bjorken and Drell is more complicate. We prefer the Fermi-Dirac quantiza-
tion scheme because it is based on the Lorenz condition
∂µA
µ = 0.
This condition is interesting for GET because of the known analogy be-
tween gauge theory and gravity. Once GET modifies the understanding of
gravity and the EEP, a similar modification of gauge symmetry would be
natural. In this scenario, the Lorenz condition would be the natural can-
didate for a physical equation, similar to the harmonic condition in GET.
It also allows a physical interpretation as a conservation law of some ether
property.
The incorporation of exact conservation laws into a field theory is a subtle
thing: while integrals over a finite domain very in time, the integral over the
whole space should be exactly conserved, without any quantum fluctuations.
An atomic ether model suggests natural ways to reach this property – if con-
servation laws are interpreted as conservation laws for numbers of atoms, and
canonical multi-particle Schro¨dinger theory is used to quantize the theory,
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this number is conserved automatically. In field theory I don’t know such
a way. But it should be noted here again that if this is a problem, it is a
problem of the field theory approximation and therefore not a fundamen-
tal problem of the ether approach. Field theory is only an approximation,
their problems are therefore not fundamental problems, but problems of an
inconsistent approximation.
13.5 Non-abelian gauge field quantization
We do not consider here the quantization of non-abelian gauge fields. The
reason is not that this seems to be very hard. It is certainly not impossible,
because they appear in real condensed matter (SU(2) in superfluid 3He−A
[76]). They may be justified as renormalizable theories which appear in a
natural way in the large scale limit [42]. For the development of discrete
atomic ether models we can also use the large amount of experience with
lattice QCD [37]. The reason is simply that I have not considered this domain
yet in sufficient detail.
13.6 Hawking radiation
For an instationary gravitational field the vacuum state and the particle
operators depend on time. Therefore, the original vacuum becomes a state
with particles. Once the basic concept remains unchanged, we obtain the
same results:
Theorem 3 Let gµν(X, T ) be a background metric in preferred coordinates
X i, T and let’s denote the set of observers in rest compared with the preferred
coordinates the “preferred observers”. Then in the canonical formalism we
obtain the same results for Hawking radiation as in the usual formalism for
the preferred set of observers.
Indeed, the formalism does not depend on the question if the background
metric is a solution of GET or GR. The only difference with the standard
formalism is the well-defined choice of the preferred observers in every mo-
ment of time. But this is simply the application of the general formalism to
this special choice of preferred observers.
But this does not mean that semi-classical GET predicts Hawking ra-
diation similar to semi-classical GR. The equivalence holds only as long as
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we use the same metric gµν . For usual configurations this can be done, the
cosmological constants Υ and Ξ may be ignored. But for the interesting case
of the gravitational collapse this is not the case. We obtain a stable “frozen
star” without horizon (see §8.5).
Therefore, during the collapse we obtain Hawking radiation. But once the
collapse has stopped, the radiation goes away and no new radiation appears,
as for stable stars in GR too. The remarkable result is that this does not
depend on the actual value of Υ > 0. Even for very small Υ the collapsing
star needs only a short time to reach the critical size of the frozen star. Once
a stable state has been reached, the radiation disappears. Stable stars do
not radiate.
Therefore, GET predicts no Hawking radiation from frozen stars. For
small enough “frozen balls” this leads to observable differences between GR
and GET. In GET they remain stable and don’t evaporate.
14 Methodology
Because of the lack of data, in the domain of quantum gravity methodologi-
cal and philosophical questions become much more important than in other
domains of science. In some sense, they become decisive.10 Does it mean that
it is impossible to find agreement about methodological issues? Fortunately,
the methodological concepts proposed by Rovelli [63] are in good agreement
with the method used here. The key idea of his methodology is the following:
... confidence in the insight that came with some theory, or ‘tak-
ing a theory seriously’, lead to major advances that largely ex-
tended the original theory itself. Of course, far from me sug-
gesting that there is anything simple, or automatic, in figuring
10Butterfield & Isham [20] describe this situation in the following words: “there are no
phenomena that can be identified unequivocally as the result of an interplay between gen-
eral relativity and quantum theory - a feature that arguably challenges the right of quan-
tum gravity to be considered as a genuine branch of science at all! ... theory construction
inevitably becomes much more strongly influenced by broad theoretical considerations,
than in mainstream areas of physics. More precisely, it tends to be based on various prima
facie views about what the theory should look like – these being grounded partly on the
philosophical prejudices of the researcher concerned ... In such circumstances, the goal
of a research programme tends towards the construction of abstract theoretical schemes
which are compatible with some preconceived conceptual frameworks”.
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out where the true insights are and in finding the way of making
them work together. But what I am saying is that figuring out
where the true insights are and finding the way of making them
work together is the work of fundamental physics. This work is
grounded on the confidence in the old theories, not on random
search of new ones. ... The ‘wild’ scientist observes that great
scientists had the courage of breaking with old and respected
ideas and assumptions, and explore new and strange hypothesis.
From this observation, the ‘wild’ scientist concludes that to do
great science one has to explore strange hypotheses, and violate
respected ideas . The wildest the hypothesis, the best. I think
wilderness in physics is sterile. The greatest revolutionaries in
science were extremely, almost obsessively, conservative.
Now, we are in full agreement with this “conservative” view on funda-
mental physics, against the popular “wilderness”. Based on this common
methodological background, we disagree mainly in one point: in the deci-
sions what are the “true insights” of the old theories which should be taken
seriously and extended into the domain of quantum gravity, and which should
be explained, derived, and therefore not extended into quantum gravity.
Now, based on these methodological rules, we present the existence of a
preferred frame as the deep insight of Bohmian mechanics. In other parts
we criticize the usual “insights” of general relativity: the relativistic notion
of “time” (§ C) and relationalism (§ B).
14.1 The insights of Bohmian mechanics
In some sense, the disagreement starts with the definition of the theories we
want to unify in quantum gravity. Usually this is presented as the problem
of unification of general relativity and special-relativistic quantum field the-
ory. But it is completely ignored that there exists already a quantum theory
of gravity – multi-particle Schro¨dinger theory for the Newtonian interaction
potential. And, moreover, there is an interesting variant of this theory –
Bohmian mechanics (BM). While it is in no way suggested that the interest-
ing and important insights of quantum field theory should be ignored, the
theories we really have to unify are general relativity and non-relativistic
Bohmian mechanics.
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We consider some details of BM in appendix F. This theory proves that
vagueness, subjectivity, and indeterminism of the usual interpretations of
quantum theory are not forced on us by the experimental facts. These are
very interesting and important insights into the nature of quantum theory –
in my opinion, insights of much more fundamental character in comparison
with the domain of applicability of particular space-time symmetries.
The problem with BM is that it requires a preferred frame, in contra-
diction with the relativity principle. In this context, it seems useful to
quote again Rovelli [63]: “So, Einstein believed the two theories, Maxwell
and Galileo. He assumed that they would hold far beyond the regime in
which they had been tested. ... If there was contradiction in putting the
two together, the problem was ours: we were surreptitiously sneaking some
incorrect assumption into our deductions.”
Now, is there a possibility to believe above theories? If we require Lorentz
invariance on the fundamental level, Bohmian mechanics should be simply
rejected and does not give any insight. This certainly violates the recom-
mendation to take above theories seriously. The choice of GET is to preserve
Lorentz invariance for observable effects, but to accept a preferred frame on
the fundamental level.
Now, the question is how much this weakens the insights of relativity.
Obviously, we do not destroy the insights of relativity completely. Instead
of “the stage does not exist” we obtain “the stage is not observable”. This
remains to be an important and non-trivial insight.
14.2 Relativity as a theory about observables
But we want to go farther. We argue that relativity is only a theory about
observables. Therefore, nothing changes if we replace “the stage does not
exist” with “the stage is not observable”.
Indeed, if there would be a difference, then there should be a method to
show the existence of unobservable objects. In classical realism, there are
such methods – the EPR criterion of reality allows to prove the existence of
such hidden objects. But this criterion has been rejected. Moreover, this is a
necessity. Without the rejection of the EPR criterion relativity would be sim-
ply falsified. Thus, after the rejection of the EPR criterion we have no longer
a chance to prove the existence of an unobservable stage. Lorentz invari-
ance is only observable Lorentz invariance. The original principle “all laws
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of nature should be Lorentz-invariant” has been replaced by “all observable
effects should be Lorentz-invariant” at least after Aspect’s experiment.
Therefore, from point of view of relativity the statements “the stage does
not exist” and “the stage is not observable” are simply identical. If we
interpret the relativistic insight “the stage does not exist” as “the stage is
not observable” we do not weaken relativity. Instead, we take the relativistic
preference for observables seriously.
Thus, we conclude that the acceptance of a preferred frame is in natural
agreement with the methodology recommended by Rovelli, which requires to
take above theories seriously.
15 The violation of Bell’s inequality
Before learning the details of the violation of Bell’s inequality, I have thought
that it gives some weak evidence in favour of a preferred frame. It was a
real surprise for me that the evidence is, instead, very strong – its not an
exaggeration to name it simply a falsification of relativity.
The whole problem is a very simple one. While relativity forbids any
superluminal causal influence, the Lorentz ether allows them, as long as their
observable consequences allow two explanations: (A → B or B → A). In
this case, they cannot be used to measure absolute time, which is forbidden
in the Lorentz ether. Now, Bell’s inequality may be violated only if (A→ B
or B → A). And, because it is violated, relativity is falsified and we have to
return to the Lorentz ether. A very nice, interesting but simple example of
an indirect existence proof.
But, instead of accepting this elementary experimental falsification, the
simple but fundamental principles used in this proof are questioned, even
rejected. The argumentation used in this context is a classical example of
immunization. Some arguments are nonsensical enough to describe the situa-
tion as a “flight from reason in science” (Goldstein [33]). Fortunately, reading
Kuhn’s “structure of scientific revolutions” [44] has recovered my optimism
about the presence of reason in science. Kuhn observes that paradigms are
never falsified by experiment alone. Their rejection always requires another
paradigm for replacement. And, without GET, the ether paradigm was sim-
ply not a viable competitor.
But with GET the ether paradigm becomes a reasonable competitor of
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relativity. Now, with GET as the background, the violation of Bell’s inequal-
ity should be reinterpreted. From point of view of competition between ether
and relativity it becomes a simple and beautiful experimental falsification of
relativity.
Of course, there seems no necessity to copy the well-known proofs of the
various variants of Bell’s inequality. Nonetheless, to explain some features
(like the simplicity of the theorem itself, the classical character of the de-
cisions and the observations and the existence of applications) the simplest
way seems to be a simple “proof for schoolboys”:
15.1 Bell’s inequality for schoolboys
There are three cards, left, middle, right, with red or black color. I have to
choose them so that:
• the left and middle cards have the same color;
• the middle and right cards have the same color;
• the left and right cards have different color.
Obviously, one of the three claims is wrong. Now, if you open two cards,
you can test one of these claims. What’s the probability p to detect a wrong
claim? Obviously p ≥ 1/3.
What if you win only with p < 1/3? Obviously, something is manipulated.
What? That’s easy: after you have chosen the first card, another card may
be manipulated. For example, imagine one card is marked. If you open this
card, you hand becomes marked. And the other card may be manipulated
so that if touched by a marked hand it changes its color.
Let’s try to avoid this possibility for manipulation. We use two rooms
and assume that no information transfer between the two rooms is possible.
In every room we have three cards, and your team has to choose one card in
every room. How can you be sure that the cards in the two rooms are the
same? Very simple, you can ask for the same card in above rooms as often
as you like, and in this case these cards should always have the same color.
Without information about the question in the other room your opponents
cannot be sure if you ask about different cards or the same cards. They have
no better strategy than to use the same predefined color for the same card.
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Therefore, we are in the same situation as before, but without the pos-
sibility to manipulate based on the information about the other question.
Therefore, we have again p ≥ 1/3. And, if not, there is a hidden information
transfer from one room to the other.
That’s all – we have proven Bell’s theorem. Let’s formulate it in the
following way:
Theorem 4 (Bell’s theorem) If Bell’s inequality p ≥ 1/3 is violated for
measurements at A and B, then there exists a causal influence (A → B or
B → A).
15.2 The difference between special relativity and
Lorentz ether
As far, we have used only classical common sense, and proven that from the
violation of Bell’s inequality follows (A → B or B → A). The question is
now how relativity and ether theory are involved.
In special relativity, we have no absolute time. Instead, in pre-relativistic
Lorentz-Poincare ether theory we have an absolute time, but we cannot mea-
sure it. Because of the ether, moving clocks are dilated and moving rulers
contracted. Now, the formulas for SR and Lorentz ether are identical. There-
fore, it is often said that above theories are identical in their predictions. But
this is not true. The violation of Bell’s inequality is an interesting difference.
In special relativity we have Einstein causality. This is a consequence
of two axioms: that there are no causal loops, and that causality is a law
of nature, and therefore has to be Lorentz invariant. Einstein causality is
Lorentz-invariant, but a notion of causality which allows faster than light
causal influences leads to causal loops. Therefore, any causal influence faster
than light is forbidden. That means, as A → B, as B → A is forbidden by
Einstein causality. Therefore, (A→ B or B → A) is forbidden too.
But in the Lorentz ether the situation is different. We have classi-
cal causality. Therefore, causal influences faster than light are not forbid-
den. There is only one restriction: all observable effects should be Lorentz-
invariant. Now, it seems to follow that such faster than light influences cannot
have observable consequences. But that’s wrong – observable effects between
space-like separated events A and B may be very well Lorentz-invariant if
they allow two explanations: (A → B or B → A). If in absolute time
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tA < tB, we use the explanation A→ B, but if tA > tB, we use explanation
B → A. Thus, (A→ B or B → A) is not forbidden in the Lorentz ether.
We conclude that there is an interesting difference in the predictions of
special relativity and Lorentz ether theory: observable correlations between
space-like separated events A and B which may be explained by causal in-
fluences (A → B or B → A) are forbidden in special relativity, but allowed
in Lorentz ether theory.
Bell’s inequality is a simple example of an effect of this type. We have
above explanations. If Alice is able to send information to Bob, they can
always win. If Bob is able to send information to Bob, they can always win
too. Thus, if they win with probability p < 1/3, we can explain this as
(A→ B or B → A). Violations of Bell’s inequality are obviously observable.
We see that it is not correct to claim that special relativity and Lorentz ether
are equivalent as physical theories. They are not. In special relativity, we
can prove Bell’s inequality for space-like separated events. In the Lorentz
ether violations of Bell’s inequality are allowed.
15.3 Aspect’s device
Now, there is no need to understand how Aspect’s device [5] works. It’s
sufficient to consider it as a black box, or, more accurate, a device consisting
of two black boxes, one for each room. You can press one of three buttons –
left, middle, right – and it gives the answer – red or black. And if Alice and
Bob use this device, your probability to find the wrong answer is p = 1/4.
That’s all.
We conclude that we have to reject special relativity and to return to
the Lorentz ether. Bell’s conclusion was similar: “the cheapest resolution is
something like going back to relativity as it was before Einstein, when people
like Lorentz and Poincare thought that there was an ether — a preferred
frame of reference — but that our measuring instruments were distorted by
motion in such a way that we could no detect motion through the ether. Now,
in that way you can imagine that there is a preferred frame of reference, and
in this preferred frame of reference things go faster than light.” [11]
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15.4 Should we question everything?
We have presented a very simple proof of Bell’s inequality. Unfortunately
proofs are certain only in mathematics. As far as we consider reality, nothing
is certain. And, therefore, everything in this proof may be (and has been)
questioned. This reaction is justified in a situation where relativity is an
unquestioned paradigm of science. But it is no longer justified in a situation
where we have a competition between two paradigms – relativity vs. ether
theory.
In this situation, the previously justified search for explanations becomes
a simple method of destruction – a method which may be applied to every
experimental falsification of a physical theory: take an arbitrary sentence
in the proof we have presented. Then, name it an “unproven hypothesis”,
explain that we “cannot be sure” that it holds, and that “far away from
our everyday experience” this common sense assumption is possibly invalid.
That’s sufficient, you have found a “loophole” in the proof. Moreover, you
will have a lot of fun if somebody tries to justify the statement you have ques-
tioned – especially because he cannot be successful. Whatever he presents,
you have a simple counter-attack: take an arbitrary sentence from his reply,
and ... you already know. This is the method described by Rovelli [63] as
“wilderness”:
The ‘wild’ scientist observes that great scientists had the courage
of breaking with old and respected ideas and assumptions, and
explore new and strange hypothesis. From this observation, the
‘wild’ scientist concludes that to do great science one has to ex-
plore strange hypotheses, and violate respected ideas . The wildest
the hypothesis, the best. I think wilderness in physics is sterile.
The greatest revolutionaries in science were extremely, almost
obsessively, conservative.
That we have to stop somewhere with the questioning is well-known in
scientific methodology. Every test of a theory requires to stop questioning at
some point. That’s a well-known fact in scientific methodology. For example,
Popper [57] writes:
Every test or theory ... must stop at some basic statement or
other which we decide to accept . If we do not come to any deci-
sion, ... then the test will have led nowhere.... Thus if the test is
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to lead us anywhere, nothing remains but to stop at some point
or other and say that we are satisfied, for the time being.
Note that this is not dangerous at all: we do not have to accept something
forever, in a dogmatical way, we can remove our acceptance whenever we have
reason to doubt. Now, the question may be only what are reasonable criteria
to stop questioning some principles, at least for time. In our case, a simple
rule seems to be that an objection should be justified by something more
than the simple and trivial remark that it is an unproven hypothesis. Based
on this basic rule let’s reject now some well known objections against our
resolution of the violation of Bell’s inequality.
Thus, unjustified, pure doubt into some common sense principle, without
reason, that means without independent evidence against the questioned
principle, should be rejected. Let’s look now at the common objections
against the obvious resolution of the violation of Bell’s inequality – the ac-
ceptance of a preferred frame.
15.5 No application for the violation
One common counter-argument is that we cannot use the violation of Bell’s
inequality for information transfer. This is really strange, because to use it
for information transfer is forbidden in the Lorentz ether too. It is simply
in contradiction with the requirement that two explanations of the violation
are possible: (A → B or B → A). If we use this device for information
transfer A→ B this is certainly in contradiction with the explanation B →
A. Therefore, we have the strange situation that it is considered to be an
argument against a theory that the prediction of this theory holds.
A variant of this argument is that the violation of Bell’s inequality cannot
be applied. That’s simply wrong. In our proof, we have described an appli-
cation – Aspect’s device allows Alice and Bob to improve their coordination
and to win in the game with probability p = 3/4 instead of 2/3. But to im-
prove coordination in similar game-like situations is the classical application
of information transfer. Therefore, even if pure communication is impossible
– for known reasons – we can apply it in a similar way to improve coordina-
tion. Moreover, it should be noted that this objection, while common, is in
no way an argument in favour of one of the competitors.
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15.6 Objections against a preferred frame
One argument which was really justified in the past is that there was no
theory of gravity with a preferred frame comparable with general relativity.
Now, with the theory presented here this argument is obsolete. Of course, all
other known arguments against the Lorentz ether may be presented in this
context. Most of them, again, are obsolete in GET.
One specific argument is worth to be considered: It is argued that it
is not natural to use two different explanations for the same observation.
But two Lorentz-equivalent configurations are not “the same” in the Lorentz
ether. That’s the general situation in the Lorentz ether. In different but
Lorentz-equivalent situations all other observable effects are explained in a
different way. In this context it is natural to have different explanations for
the violation of Bell’s inequality too, much more natural than to have the
same explanation.
Now, you may like or not like the properties of the Lorentz ether – the
question is if (A → B or B → A) is allowed in the Lorentz ether or not,
if there are arguments against the experimental falsification of relativity.
To count here metaphysical arguments against the other competitor is re-
ally strange. If we accept arguments about metaphysical beauty as decisive
against an experimental falsification, this is simply the end of science.
15.7 No contradiction with quantum mechanics
Then where is a whole class of common objections: objections related with
the strangeness of quantum theory. The strangeness of the double slit ex-
periment or the quantum eraser seems to suggests that the preferred frame
is not the problem, and that the common sense principles we have used in
our proof are in contradiction with quantum theory. Of course, we can argue
here that the burden of proof is on the side of the people who claim that
there is such a contradiction. But we don’t have to – instead, we can prove
that there is no such contradiction.
Theorem 5 There is no contradiction between the principles used in the
proof of Bell’s theorem and the predictions of non-relativistic quantum theory.
The proof is given by Bohmian mechanics – a hidden variable theory of
quantum mechanics found by David Bohm [16]. In a “quantum equilibrium”,
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this theory makes the same predictions as non-relativistic quantum theory,
therefore, no prediction of non-relativistic quantum theory is in contradiction
with the predictions of Bohmian mechanics. But Bohmian mechanics is in
full agreement with the common sense principles used in the proof of Bell’s
theorem. We consider Bohmian mechanics in appendix F.
Thus, “quantum strangeness” is not a reason to reject the proof. All
arguments related with double slit experiments, spin, quantum erasers, the
“wholeness” of quantum theory and so on are irrelevant. It gives no support
for the thesis that something is wrong with the proof of Bell’s theorem.
15.8 Objections in conflict with Einstein causality
There is another class of objections which may be rejected as a whole. It is
based on the assumption that Einstein causality is considered as a prediction
of relativity. The idea is a detailed consideration of an assumed faster than
light phone line. Let’s assume such a phone line exists. In this case, we
obviously have to give up relativity as falsified. Nonetheless, let’s consider
the seemingly nonsensical question how we can prove this based on the ob-
servation. The point is that we can play here the same game of “questioning
everything”. Now, in this situation this looks certainly nonsensical. Surpris-
ingly, we look at the details, we find that we have to use assumptions which
may be and have been questioned in the discussion about Bell’s inequality.
We propose the following criterion: all assumptions and principles which
have to be used to prove that a really working superluminal phone line falsifies
Einstein causality should not be questioned in the proof of Bell’s theorem.
Now, let’s look how to prove this. Let’s consider the basic device which
transfers one bit of information. The FTL phone consists of two black boxes.
We make some decision and press a button on our box. Our friend makes a
measurement on his side of the box and obtains a result. Then, we meet later
and compare our decisions with his observations. If we observe a significant
correlation we conclude that the phone works.
We see that the experimental situation is very close to the situation in
the violation of Bell’s inequality, and really includes parts which have been
questioned:
• The device is a black box, we don’t know how it works. This is similar
to our presentation of Aspect’s device as a black box. Therefore, every
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argumentation which requires some insight into this black box before
accepting that some causal information transfer has happened should
be rejected.
• We essentially use the free will of the experimenter. Of course, as
in Bell’s theorem, the experimenter may be replaced by various other
random number generators to obtain certainty that the input – the
decision of the experimenter – is not predefined. But that’s enough.
Every argument which does not accept this as sufficient to establish the
independence of the decision of the experimenter should be rejected.
• We can verify the existence of a non-trivial correlation only after the
experiment has finished, using other methods of information transfer.
It is typical for “many world” explanations or explanations based on
“superpositions of observers”: nothing non-local happens, only if the
observers meet again, with usual subluminal speed, something collapses
and we obtain the correlations in a miraculous quantum way. These
explanations should be rejected too.
• Note also the general objection what we observe only a correlation.
Having only a correlation, we cannot conclude that there really exists
a causal relation in reality. We need some principle which allows to
make the step from observable correlations to the conclusion that there
exists a real causal interaction. Every criticism which rejects the way
this has been done in the proof of Bell’s inequality but does not describe
an alternative way to conclude from observation that a real, causal
relation exists should be rejected.
• We know that as A→ B, as B → A is forbidden by Einstein causality.
Therefore, (A → B or B → A) is forbidden too. This is obvious.
But there exists a well-known psychological bias known as “disjunction
fallacy” [67]: if there are two alternatives, and above alternatives lead
to the same conclusion (in our case: the falsification of relativity), but
we are not sure which alternative happens, we tend not to make the
conclusion. It seems, this fallacy is the base for arguments of type “we
are unable to detect the direction of influence”.
Again, our argumentation allows to reject a whole class of common ob-
jections. Of course, it works only if we want to defend Einstein causality
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as a physical prediction of relativity. It does not work against the idea of
rejection of causality itself, for example following Price [59].
15.9 Discussion
Bell’s inequality is a prediction of SR which does not hold in LET. Therefore
the violation of Bell’s inequality falsifies SR and requires to accept a preferred
frame. The proof is indirect but so simple and straightforward that it is hard
to imagine a stronger indirect falsification of a physical theory.
The consideration of the common counter-arguments has not given any
serious loopholes. Instead, most of the common arguments are part of two
classes we have rejected: objections based on assumed contradictions with
quantum principles, and objections which, if accepted, would allow to immu-
nize relativity even if we have working superluminal phone lines.
What remains is the possibility to question everything. Certain proofs
exist only in mathematics, not in physics. Immunization of a physical theory
is always possible. In principle, objections are always possible. Last not
least, we are talking about reality, not about pure mathematics. But there is
no independent evidence which suggests that some part of this proof should
be questioned. Therefore, the rejection of the proof of Bell’s inequality has
to be qualified as an ad hoc immunization of relativity.
Nonetheless, in § E we consider the EPR criterion in more detail. We
present there evidence for the thesis that the principles used in the proof
of Bell’s inequality – principles we denote as “EPR realism” – are of more
fundamental character than space-time symmetries.
16 Conclusions
General ether theory proposes a paradigm shift back from relativity to a clas-
sical Newtonian background. It heals the main problems of the old Lorentz
ether:
• relativistic symmetry is explained in a general, simple way;
• the ether is generalized to gravity;
• the ether is compressible, changes in time;
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• there is no longer an action-reaction problem;
In various parts of fundamental physics we find advantages of the new
approach:
• we obtain local energy and momentum density for gravity;
• the problem of time of quantum gravity is solved;
• singularities in physical important situations disappear;
• frozen stars instead of black holes solve the information loss problem
of quantum gravity;
• we obtain a reasonable dark matter term;
• a big bounce instead of a big bang solves the cosmological horizon
problem without inflation;
• the EPR criterion of reality holds;
• a generalization of Bohmian mechanics into the relativistic domain be-
comes unproblematic;
Even in the domain of beauty GET seems to be able to compete with GR:
it seems that some of the most beautiful aspects of the mathematical appara-
tus of GR obtain a physical interpretation in the context of GET: harmonic
coordinates, ADM decomposition, triad formalism, Regge calculus. Espe-
cially the beautiful relation between covariance and conservation laws has to
be mentioned here: it gives in GET two nice expressions for the conservation
laws, but in GR it makes energy conservation highly problematic.
Reconsidering the metaphysical foundations of relativity, we have found
serious flaws:
• A reconsideration of the violation of Bell’s inequality suggests its in-
terpretation as a falsification of relativity; the rejection of the EPR
criterion of reality should be interpreted as an immunization of rela-
tivity: except its contradiction with the relativity principle there is no
independent evidence against the EPR criterion.
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• A new quantization problem – named scalar product problem – suggests
that a really relativistic covariant quantum theory fails to describe the
non-relativistic limit.
• The consideration of the “insight” of relativity into the nature of time
suggests that it is based on conflation of different physical notions –
clock time and “true” time. All they have in common is that they have
been named “time”.
• The consideration of general covariance and relationalism shows that
these are not advantages of relativity, but can always be reached – by
forgetting valuable information.
On the other hand, we have been unable to detect serious difficulties of
the new approach: there is no evidence that the introduction of a preferred
frame is problematic in any part of modern physics.
But, of course, a lot of interesting questions remain open, especially the
physical interpretation of gauge fields and fermions, Lagrange formalisms
for condensed matter compatible with the GET scheme, the details of the
related hidden relativistic symmetry in usual condensed matter. The unifi-
cation of the geometrical methods developed for GR quantization with the
canonical quantization schemes for condensed matter will be interesting for
above domains: it defines how to regularize in quantum gravity, and it gives
geometrical interpretation in condensed matter theory.
A Covariant description for theories with
preferred coordinates
The covariant description we consider here is quite simple: we handle the
preferred coordinates formally as “scalar fields” Xµ(x). This allows to de-
scribe a theory with preferred coordinates in a covariant way. An interesting
point of this covariant description is that the Euler-Lagrange equations for
the preferred coordinates are the conservation laws.
This is quite obvious and may be considered as a “folk theorem”.
Nonetheless, confusion about the physical meaning of “covariance” seems
quite common, and it does not seem to be widely known. That’s why it
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seems reasonable to describe the “weak covariant” description we use in more
detail.
A.1 Making the Lagrangian covariant
We assume that we live in a Newtonian framework. That means, there is
an absolute Euclidean space and absolute time. To describe this absolute
background, we use preferred coordinates X i, T = X0. As usual, Latin
indices vary from 1 to 3, Greek indices from 0 to 3. Of course, to use other
coordinates xµ is not forbidden, the coordinates X i, T are only preferred –
the laws of nature are simpler in these coordinates.
Now let’s consider how to obtain a covariant description starting from a
non-covariant one:
Theorem 6 Let S =
∫
L(T ······ , ∂µT
···
··· ) be a functional which depend on com-
ponents T ······ and first derivatives ∂µT
···
··· of tensor fields T.
Then there exists a covariant functional Sc =
∫
Lc(T
···
··· , ∂µT
···
··· , X
µ
,ν) which
depends on the components and first derivatives of the same tensor fields T
and on the first derivatives Xµ,ν of four scalar fields X
µ(x) so that
S(T ) = Sc(T,X
µ
,ν)
for Xµ(x) = xµ.
Proof: In L we replace the tensor components by expressions using the
following replacement rules for all indices:
T ···µ······ →
∂Xµ
∂xν
T ···ν······
T ······µ··· →
∂xν
∂Xµ
T ······ν···
T ······,µ →
∂xν
∂Xµ
T ······,ν
T ···µ······,· →
∂Xµ
∂xν
T ···ν······,·
T ······µ···,· →
∂xν
∂Xµ
T ······ν···,·
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The matrix ∂x
ν
∂Xµ
is the inverse matrix of ∂X
µ
∂xν
. We use this property to
express all occurrences of ∂x
ν
∂Xµ
by these rational functions ofXµ,ν . ForX
µ(x) =
xµ these are obviously identical transformations. Moreover, each argument is
now a covariant scalar. Indeed, the indices µ of the Xµ,ν are not tensor indices,
but enumerate the scalar fields Xµ(x). But indices of this type are the only
open indices in the expression. Therefore, being a function of covariant scalar
expressions, the modified function Lc is a covariant scalar function, qed.
Covariant functions like Lc which do not depend on the fields X
µ(x) we
name “strong covariant”, to distinguish them from “weak covariant” func-
tions which depend on the fields Xµ(x).
Of course, what is not part of this theorem is how to interpret something
defined only in the preferred coordinates as a component of some tensor field.
This is, essentially, the real problem if we have to make a theory covariant.
There are usually different possibilities: a 3D scalar may be a 4D scalar as
well as a component of a 4D vector or tensor field. But this is a question of
the definition of the theory itself. We are interested here only in a special
way to obtain a covariant description of a well-defined theory.
A.2 Conservation laws in the covariant formalism
This formalism raises two interesting questions. First, once we have a co-
variant formalism, we obtain the known problems with conservation laws –
Noether’s theorem does not give non-trivial conservation laws. Second, we
have four new Euler-Lagrange equations for S =
∫
L – the Euler-Lagrange
equations for the preferred coordinates Xµ. What is their physical meaning?
Now, the answer is simple and beautiful – the Euler-Lagrange equations for
the preferred coordinates are the conservation laws. All we need is to look
at the Euler-Lagrange equations for the preferred coordinates:
Theorem 7 If a Lagrangian L does not depend explicitly on the coordinates,
then the Euler-Lagrange equation of the related weak covariant Lagrangian Lc
for the preferred coordinates Xµ defines conservation laws for the tensor
T νµ = −
∂Lc
∂Xµ,ν
If the original Lagrangian L is covariant, then T νµ = 0.
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If there was no explicit coordinate-dependence in the original Lagrangian,
there is none in Lc too. Note also that for a covariant Lagrangian L we
have L ≡ Lc and does not depend on Xµ and Xµ,nu. This follows from the
construction. The theorem now follows immediately from the the Euler-
Lagrange equation for the Xµ:
δS
δXµ
=
∂L
∂Xµ
− ∂ν ∂L
∂Xµ,ν
= 0
The results about the existence of conservation laws are equivalent to
Noether’s theorem, but the energy-momentum tensor is not the same. The
relation between preferred coordinates and conservation laws is a much more
direct one in this formalism: de facto one line was sufficient for the proof. We
have not used the other Euler-Lagrange equations. That’s why we consider
this variant of the conservation law as the more fundamental one.
We conclude: the Euler-Lagrange equations for the preferred coordinates
are the conservation laws.
B Relationalism
The confusion about covariance has historical reasons. Initially covariance
was believed to be a special, distinguishing property of GR. Later it has
been recognized that every physical theory allows a covariant formulation.
For example, Fock [31] has given a covariant formulation for special relativity.
A simple way to do this is to use the curvature tensor of a metric gij. The
equation Rijkl = 0 defines a flat metric in a covariant way. Once a flat
background has been defined, all partial derivatives of the equations in the
preferred frame may be replaced by covariant derivatives of this background
metric. This method has been widely used to present theories of gravity with
predefined geometries, for example [48], [52].
Nonetheless, this does not mean that this question is completely clear
now. The situation is confusing. On one hand, every theory allows a covari-
ant formulation, on the other hand, there is a non-trivial symmetry property
– the property we have named “strong covariance” in GET. Rovelli [63] de-
scribes it using the notions “active vs. passive diff invariance”:
All this is coded in the active diffeomorphism invariance (diff
invariance) of GR. Passive diff invariance is a property of a formu-
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lation of a dynamical theory, while active diff invariance is a prop-
erty of the dynamical theory itself. A field theory is formulated in
manner invariant under passive diffs (or change of coordinates), if
we can change the coordinates of the manifold, re-express all the
geometric quantities (dynamical and non-dynamical) in the new
coordinates, and the form of the equations of motion does not
change. A theory is invariant under active diffs, when a smooth
displacement of the dynamical fields (the dynamical fields alone)
over the manifold, sends solutions of the equations of motion into
solutions of the equations of motion.
This is in agreement with our understanding. The problematic part is
how to distinguish dynamical and non-dynamical fields. Rovelli continues:
Distinguishing a truly dynamical field, namely a field with
independent degrees of freedom, from a non-dynamical field dis-
guised as dynamical (such as a metric field g with the equations
of motion Riemann[g]=0) might require a detailed analysis (for
instance, Hamiltonian) of the theory.
That means, it is assumed that an analysis of the equations of the theory
– the dynamics – allows to distinguish the non-dynamical and the dynamical
steps of freedom of the theory. The example of GET and its relation with
general relativity with four scalar dark matter fields (GRDM) allows to proof
that this is impossible:
Thesis: It is impossible to distinguish a non-covariant theory with a
“preferred frame in disguise” from a “truly” covariant physical theory by
evaluation of the equations of motion and the Lagrange formalism.
Indeed, in GET, the preferred coordinates Xµ are non-dynamical, and
their presentation as “dynamical fields” Xµ(x) fits exactly with the descrip-
tion of a “non-dynamical field disguised as dynamical”. As we have seen,
the equation for the preferred coordinates Xµ(x) is simply the harmonic
equation, thus, the usual general-relativistic equation for scalar fields. On
the other hand, in GRDM the four scalar fields are dynamical. But the
Lagrange formalism for GET is exactly the Lagrange formalism for GRDM.
A variant of this argument is the consideration of GET with the four
“preferred coordinates in disguise” Xµ(x) and a few additional free scalar
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fields ϕm(x). Then, looking at the equations and the Lagrangian, there is no
way to tell what are the truly dynamical scalar fields ϕm(x) and what are
the coordinates in disguise Xµ(x). We need additional a-priori information,
additional insight.
Once the equations are identical, even a “Hamiltonian analysis” (what-
ever this means in detail) cannot help. But there is an interesting point: the
Hamilton formalism is different for GET and GRDM. In GRDM we have
the typical problems of general-relativistic theories where the Hamiltonian
is a constraint. Instead, in GET we have a classical Hamilton formalism,
and the Hamiltonian is not a constraint. But we cannot derive the Hamilton
formalism of GET without the additional information that the fields Xµ(x)
are the preferred coordinates. Without this information we cannot decide
which Hamilton formalism is the appropriate one.
Note that our thesis does not mean that there are no differences between
GET and the “truly relativistic” theory GRDM. The differences we have
considered in § 7. Our thesis is that we need additional insight – the insight
that the fields Xµ are preferred coordinates – to be able to distinguish a
theory with absolutes from a “truly relativistic” theory.
B.1 What is the true “insight” of general relativity?
This observation seems to destroy the whole concept described by Rovelli
[63]:
One of the thesis of this essay, is that general relativity is the
expression of one of these insights, which will stay with us “for-
ever”. The insight is that the physical world does not have a
stage, that localization and motion are relational only, that diff-
invariance (or something physically analogous) is required for any
fundamental description of our world . . . .
In GR, the objects of which the world is made do not live over a
stage and do not live on spacetime: they live, so to say, over each
other’s shoulders.
But, as we have seen, this is not an insight, but a tautological reformula-
tion. If the theory has a stage, we can reformulate it and name the stage a
dynamical field. Instead of “absolute motion” we talk about “motion relative
to the stage field”. Let’s see how Rovelli describes Einstein’s “insight”:
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Of course, nothing prevents us, if we wish to do so, from singling
out the gravitational field as “the more equal among equals”,
and declaring that location is absolute in GR, because it can be
defined with respect to it. But this can be done within any rela-
tionalism: we can always single out a set of objects, and declare
them as not-moving by definition. The problem with this atti-
tude is that it fully misses the great Einsteinian insight: that
Newtonian spacetime is just one field among the others.
The situation between GET and GRDM is the reverse one. The fields
Xµ(x) are not just scalar fields among others. But this is a non-trivial in-
sight. If we forget this insight, and the fields Xµ(x) are interpreted just
as fields among others, we have lost important information and interesting
predictions. In this way, by forgetting interesting information, a relational
description is always possible. Therefore, the existence of a relational descrip-
tion is only an insight into the mathematical formalism of physical theories
in general, not an insight of GR. Instead, in GET the existence of absolutes
– the preferred coordinates Xµ(x) – is a non-trivial insight which leads to
interesting predictions: the fields Xµ(x) may be used as global coordinates,
the field X0(x) is time-like.
B.2 What are insights which are “forever”?
What would be an important insight is that a theory with a certain type of
absolutes is impossible in nature. But for this insight general relativity is not
enough. This can be, by its nature, only an impossibility proof for certain
classes of theories. Such an insight may be based on certain observational
facts, for example, observations of a worm-hole. This would be incompatible
with a whole class of theories with flat background. Such an observation of
a non-trivial topology, for example a worm-hole, would be really an insight
which remains forever.11 But we have not observed such non-trivial topology.
A lecture which can be learned from history of science is that metaphys-
ical preferences like between relationalism and the existence of a predefined
11Another example of this type of insight is the violation of Bell’s inequality, which
excludes a whole class of theories – theories which allow the proof of Bell’s inequality
for space-like separated observations. This can be named also an “insight of quantum
theory”. But this would be a very sloppy description: the proof of Bell’s is classical, and
the violation of Bell’s inequality has been observed in real experiments.
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stage should not be justified based on the current physical theory. Rovelli
himself has presented the best example of this type – Newton’s insight, re-
lated with the famous rotating bucket, that there exists an absolute space.
This insight, which was thought to remain forever too, was rejected by Ein-
stein. In Einstein’s theory, we have relationalism, no absolutes. But this
insight may be as well superseded by another theory. GET proves that this
is possible.
There is another example of an interesting metaphysical question where
we tend to use current physical theory: probability versus determinism. Here
we have even more switches between probabilistic chaos and determinism.
Bohmian theory (deterministic), quantum theory (probabilistic), classical
mechanics (deterministic), chaos in the many-particle situation (probabilis-
tic), classical thermodynamics (deterministic), and chaos in its large scale
predictions. Therefore, to base the metaphysical decision between chaos and
determinism on current physical theory is highly speculative. To guess that
this property remains forever is sufficiently falsified by historical evidence.
There are important insights of general relativity. For example that a
special physical entity which was absolute in Newton’s theory is not abso-
lute in reality. It is the entity which defines inertial forces and causes the
difference between a rotating bucket and a bucket in rest. This entity is the
gravitational field. This insight into the nature of gravity and clock time will
stay forever.
Another insight is the Einstein equivalence principle. Because this is an
exact symmetry claim, we cannot be sure that it remains forever – but we
can be sure that it survives at least as an approximative symmetry.
C The problem of time
It is well-known that the problem of time may be solved by the introduc-
tion of a preferred foliation as in GET: “in quantum gravity, one response
to the problem of time is to ‘blame’ it on general relativity’s allowing ar-
bitrary foliations of spacetime; and then to postulate a preferred frame of
spacetime with respect to which quantum theory should be written. Most
general relativists feel this response is too radical to countenance: they regard
foliation-independence as an undeniable insight of relativity.” [20]
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C.1 clock time vs. true time
To meet this argument, we have to consider the “insight of relativity” about
the nature of time and the metaphysical aspects of the “problem of time” in
more detail. In some sense, the problem of time may be discussed based on
Newton’s definition [53]. Newton distinguishes two notions of time:
... I do not define time, space, place, and motion as being well
known to all. Only I observe, that the common people conceive
these quantities under no other notions but from the relation they
bear to sensible objects. And thence arise certain prejudices, for
the removing of which it will be convenient to distinguish them
into absolute and relative, true and apparent, mathematical and
common.
I. Absolute, true and mathematical time, of itself, and from its
own nature, flows equable without relation to anything external,
and by another name is called duration: relative, apparent, and
common time, is some sensible and external (whether accurate
or unequable) measure of duration by means of motion, which is
commonly used instead of true time; such as an hour, a day, a
month, a year.
This definition is in agreement with GET. Here, we have an unob-
servable harmonic “true time” T (x) together with the “apparent time”
τ =
∫ √
gµνdxµdxν measured with clocks. These two notions of time may be
roughly identified with “time of quantum theory” and “time of relativity”:
Indeed, in quantum theory we have no self-adjoint operator for time mea-
surement. Instead, it is closely related with the fundamental aspects of quan-
tum theory: physical quantities have to be measured at a given time, the
scalar product is conserved under time evolution. Thus, it ideally fits with
Newtons “true time” and should be distinguished from “apparent time”.
On the other hand, time in relativity is defined to be apparent time.
General-relativistic time is the time measured by clocks – “measure of dura-
tion by means of motion”. And its most interesting physical property is that
it is unequable. The fit with Newton’s definition of apparent time is simply
ideal.
Therefore, if we deny Newton’s insight into the different nature of true
and apparent time, and try to develop quantum gravity without making this
71
distinction, we are immediately faced with the problem to unify these two
different notions of time. This is the metaphysical base of the notorious
“problem of time” in quantum gravity.
C.2 About positivistic arguments against true time
The standard relativistic argumentation against this understanding of time
is the rejection of “true time” based on positivistic arguments. The typical
argument is that a physical notion needs an operational definition. If we
cannot measure something, then it is not part of physics.
Now, this argumentation is based on positivistic methodology of science,
which has been rejected by Popper [57]. According to Popper’s “logic of
scientific discovery” theory is prior to observation. Therefore, the fundamen-
tal objects of a theory are not based on observation, they do not need any
operational definition. It is not the observation which decides about the fun-
damental notions of the theory. Instead, observation is always theory-laden.
In Einstein’s famous words, it is the “theory which decides what is observ-
able”. Positivism reverts the relation between theory and observation. All
what is required in science is that the theory, as a whole, makes a lot of fal-
sifiable predictions. An operational definition of some fundamental notions
of the theory is a useful tool to obtain such predictions, but not more. Posi-
tivism is simply wrong. Again, in Einstein’s words about Bohr’s positivism:
”Perhaps I did use such a philosophy earlier, and even wrote it, but it is
nonsense all the same.”
Moreover, in our case we do not have to rely on such methodological
considerations. Instead, we have a beautiful example of a theory with unob-
servable “true time” – classical quantum theory. We have already mentioned
that there is no self-adjoint operator for time measurement. As a conse-
quence, no physical clock can provide a precise measure of time. There is
always a small probability that a real clock will run backward with respect
to it [70]. Nonetheless, the time of quantum theory is not only an important
part of quantum theory. A lot of people have tried hard to remove time from
quantum theory, without success.
The example of time in quantum theory is not only a powerful illustration
of the failure of positivistic argumentation, but answers the question about
the physical meaning of true time: the simple answer is “the same as in
classical quantum theory”. The advantage of this answer is that we do not
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need any vague metaphysical considerations about the nature of “true time”.
C.3 Relativity as an insight about true time
On the other hand, positivistic argumentation against true time is not the
only relativistic argumentation. It seems, a lot of relativistic scientists ac-
knowledge very well that there is more behind the notion of time than simple
clock measurement.
Indeed, let’s for this argument accept the positivistic argumentation that
there is nothing like “true time”, and the only physically meaningful notion
of time is clock time. What, in this case, is the physical meaning of the
following – rather typical – relativistic argumentation [68]:
One often hears that what General Relativity did was to make
time depend on gravity ... Such a dependence of time on grav-
ity would have been strange enough for the Newtonian view, but
General Relativity is actually much more radical than that.12 ...
Rather the theory states that the phenomena we usually ascribe
to gravity are actually caused by time’s flowing unequable from
place to place.... Most people find it very difficult even to imag-
ine how such a statement could be true. ... That gravity could
affect time, or rather could affect the rate at which clocks run,
is acceptable, but that gravity is in any sense the same as time
seems naively unimaginable.
As we see, the point is not that apparent time – time measurement with
clocks – is influenced by gravity. This is only the part which is already
“acceptable” to people who have not really understood relativity. The point
which is considered to be the “naively unimaginable” insight of relativity is
the identification with “time” – obviously not “apparent time”, but “true
time”. Thus, the non-existing ghost of true time revives here in its full
beauty, as an important, fundamental insight of relativity.
In my understanding we have here a conflict between two common rela-
tivistic argumentations. On one hand, the rejection of the notion of “true
12We have to disagree with this claim that a dependence of apparent time on gravity
would have been strange for the Newtonian view. Last not least, a classical clock based
on Newtonian theory – the pendulum clock – obviously depends on gravity.
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time” and the reduction of time to clock time measurement, on the other
hand the metaphysical identification of the same “true time” with time mea-
surement, presented as an “insight of relativity”. This contradiction shows
that there is not much in support of this “insight” except methodological
confusion:
Or we accept that there is nothing behind “time” except clock measure-
ment. Then no non-trivial insight into the nature of “true time” exists. The
(nonetheless very important) insight of relativity is about the influence of
gravity on clocks.
Or we accept that time is more than clock measurement. Then there is
no empirical base for the identification of clock time with this other notion
of time. The identification is not only a purely metaphysical hypothesis
without empirical support. Moreover, this metaphysical hypothesis is highly
questionable, it seems to be based only on misunderstanding because the
two notions are usually described with the same word – time. Simply two
completely different notions of time which have been distinguished already
by Newton have been mingled.
C.4 Technical aspects of the problem of time
The metaphysical choice to identify quantum true time with relativistic clock
time leads to subsequent technical problems. In different approaches to quan-
tum gravity the problem of time shows in different ways. It is not the purpose
of this paper to consider them, we refer here to [20], [39], [6] for further de-
tails. But an example may be informative. In the canonical approach which
seems to be the closest to our approach, some “internal coordinates” have to
be chosen. But this leads to a “multiple choice problem” [39]:
Generically, there is no geometrically natural choice for the in-
ternal spacetime coordinates and, classically, all have an equal
standing. However, this classical cornucopia becomes a real prob-
lem at the quantum level since there is no reason to suppose that
the theories corresponding to different choices of time will agree.
The crucial point is that two different choices of internal coor-
dinates are related by a canonical transformation and, in this
sense, are classically of equal validity. However, one of the cen-
tral properties/problems of the quantization of any non-linear
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system is that, because of the well-known Van-Hove phenomenon
[73], most classical canonical transformations cannot be repre-
sented by unitary operators while, at the same time, maintaining
the irreducibility of the canonical commutation relations. This
means that in quantizing a system it is always necessary to select
some preferred sub-algebra of classical observables which is to be
quantized.
D Quantum gravity requires a common back-
ground
In this section, we consider an interesting problem of the quantization of GR.
This problem has been the starting point for the author. It strongly suggest
that for successful quantization GR should be modified, especially that it is
necessary to introduce a common background manifold.
The main difference between GR and other theories including SR is that
GR is a “one world theory”. It does not have a possibility to compare different
gravitational fields. In other theories we have some common background.
This allows to talk about values at “the same point” for different solutions.
In GR, this is not possible. Another solution may be defined even on another
manifold.
This is not problematic because a possibility to compare different solu-
tions is not necessary in the classical domain. As long as we consider classical
gravitational fields, there is only one solution we can observe, there is only
“one world”. Therefore, in the classical domain a “one world theory” does
not cause problems. But what about quantum superposition? In a superpo-
sitional state we can consider different classical solutions in a single state. Is
a “one world theory” sufficient to describe superpositions? Or is there more
information hidden in a superpositional state? Especially, is there informa-
tion about relative position between the states which are in superposition?
This simple question may be the key for the understanding of quantum
theory. There seem to be only two ways to answer this question: yes or no.
The relativistic answer is a clear no. Our answer is a clear yes. A nice way
to formalize the two possible answers has been proposed by Anandan [3]:
the notions of c-covariance and q-covariance. We consider superpositions of
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quasi-classical gravitational fields. Now, we have to look what happens if we
apply diffeomorphisms. We have different fields, and this raises the question
if we are allowed to use different diffeomorphisms for these different fields
or not. This leads to two ways to generalize classical covariance: The first,
weak generalization is c-covariance – it requires covariance only if we apply
the same diffeomorphism. The second, strong generalization is q-covariance
– it allows different diffeomorphisms for the different states in superposition.
Now, the relativistic answer is unique – the only appropriate generaliza-
tion is q-covariance. The reason is that c-covariance requires an essential
modification of classical GR. Indeed, the Einstein equations of classical GR
defines a pair of solutions only modulo q-covariance. The GR Lagrangian
is also q-covariant. Thus, to define the evolution of c-covariant but not q-
covariant objects we simply do not have appropriate equations in classical
GR. Moreover, even the notion of “the same diffeomorphism” is not appro-
priately defined in GR. Different GR solutions live on different manifolds,
and there is no well-defined notion of “the same diffeomorphism” on another
manifold. This is the solution which has been proposed by Anandan too.
We have chosen the other way. We think that the description of a su-
perposition requires additional, non-q-covariant information. The purpose of
this section is to justify this choice.
Let’s start with a simple question – the superposition of a state with a
shifted version of itself: |gij(x)〉+ |gij(x−x0)〉. Do you really think this may
be simply the original state, not a non-trivial superposition? I’m not. But,
of course, this simple argument does not seem to be sufficient.
Fortunately, we can present a much stronger argumentation. As we see,
already a very simple scattering experiment on such superpositional states
gives observables which depend on “relative position”.
D.1 A non-relativistic quantum gravity observable
In the consideration of quantum gravity, people usually consider two basic
theories: classical general relativity and relativistic quantum field theory on
a fixed background. But these are not really the theories which have to be
unified – the gravitational field is classical in above theories. The interesting
point of quantum gravity is, of course, the consideration of superpositions of
gravitational fields. It is, last not least, superposition which makes quantum
theory different from classical statistics. And this difference will be the point
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of our experiment: what we want to measure is the transition probability
which decides if a superposition has been destroyed by measurement or not.
The problem with semi-classical QFT is that it does not give a base for such
considerations.
On the other hand, it is not at all difficult to compute such transition
probabilities in a reasonable approximation. For this purpose, we can use a
well-known simple theory which allows to consider non-trivial superpositions
of gravitational fields. This theory is simply non-relativistic quantum grav-
ity – classical multi-particle Schro¨dinger theory with Newtonian interaction
potential.
There is nothing ill-defined with this theory. From theoretical point of
view it works as well as multi-particle Schro¨dinger theory with Coulomb
interaction potential. The fact that we have no data is not really problematic.
Indeed, the theory unifies classical quantum principles with classical gravity
in an ideal way. If somebody tends to doubt simply because there are no data,
quantum gravity is a forbidden area for him. Thus, to assume the correctness
of Schro¨dinger theory in the non-relativistic limit is not problematic. But,
of course, it is a non-trivial decision: We assume that classical Schro¨dinger
theory is the non-relativistic limit of quantum gravity.
Now, based on this non-relativistic theory we can consider simple gravi-
tational scattering. This gives some insight into features of superpositions of
gravitational fields, even if the field itself is not quantized. We simply have
to consider superpositional states of an otherwise neutral particle. We need
the particle only as a source of gravity. Thus, let’s consider a situation like a
double slit experiment, with some superpositional state |ψ1〉+|ψ2〉 of a source
of gravity. For the interaction with a test particle |ϕ〉 only the gravitational
field of the source is important. Thus, it is possible to interpret the inter-
action also as an interaction of the test particle |ϕ〉 with a superpositional
state of the gravitational field |g1〉+ |g2〉.
Now, let’s make some simplifying assumptions. First, let the mass M of
the source particle be much greater than the mass m of the test particle:
M ≫ m. In this case, the state of the heavy particle is much less influenced
by the interaction than the state of the test particle. Let’s also assume
that the state of the source particle is highly localized: ψ1(x) ≈ δ(x − x1),
ψ2 ≈ δ(x − x2). In this case, we can use single particle theory to compute
the result of the interaction. Let’s denote with ϕ1, ϕ2 the solution of the
Schro¨dinger equation for the source particle located in x1 resp. x2. Then, for
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the two-particle problem with the initial values |ψ1〉⊗|ϕ〉 resp. |ψ2〉⊗|ϕ〉 we
obtain approximately a tensor product solution |ψ1〉⊗ |ϕ1〉 resp. |ψ2〉⊗ |ϕ2〉.
For the superpositional state (|ψ1〉 + |ψ2〉) ⊗ |ϕ〉 we obtain the solution by
superposition:
|ψ1〉| ⊗ |ϕ1〉+ |ψ2〉| ⊗ |ϕ2〉.
But this is equivalent to
(|ψ1〉+ |ψ2〉)⊗ (|ϕ1〉+ |ϕ2〉) + (|ψ1〉 − |ψ2〉)⊗ (|ϕ1〉 − |ϕ2〉)
Now, we are interested in the transition probability |ψ1〉+ |ψ2〉 → |ψ1〉−
|ψ2〉. We obtain
ptrans =
1
2
(1− Re〈ϕ1|ϕ2〉)
To understand why we are very interested in this transition probability
let’s consider the limiting cases: if 〈ϕ1|ϕ2〉 = 1, gravitational interaction is
not important, the position of the source particle does not influence the state
of the test particle. Thus, the superpositional state remains unchanged, the
interaction with the test particle was not a measurement of position of the
source particle. We have a tensor product state. Therefore, we can ignore
the test particle and obtain a pure one-particle state for the source.
In the other limiting case, the resulting states are orthogonal, 〈ϕ1|ϕ2〉 = 0,
therefore, the transition probability is 1
2
. We do not have a product state.
If we ignore the test particle, we do not obtain a pure source particle state.
Instead, we obtain a classical mixed state:
1
2
(|ψ1〉〈ψ1|+ |ψ2〉〈ψ2|)
Thus, the transition probability defines if the interaction was a measure-
ment which has destroyed the superposition or not. If there is something
which allows to distinguish a superposition from a classical mixed state,
than this “something” gives us information about the transition probability.
If not, then we cannot distinguish the superposition from a mixed state.
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D.2 The problem: generalization to relativistic quasi-
classical gravity
Therefore, this transition probability is very important. If it is not observ-
able, what distinguishes the theory from a classical statistical theory? Is a
theory which does not allow to distinguish a superposition from a classical
mixed state worth to be named “quantum theory”? This seems questionable.
Thus, the assumption that this transition probability remains observable in
full, relativistic quantum gravity seems to be a very natural one.
Now, to compute the transition probability, we need the scalar product
〈ϕ1|ϕ2〉. For the derivation of this formula, we have used only very few
fundamental principles. Therefore, it seems reasonable to assume that this
formula may be generalized. We make the following hypothesis: The scalar
product 〈ϕ1|ϕ2〉 is well-defined in relativistic quantum gravity.
Now, let’s consider how to generalize it into the relativistic domain. The
basic states of the source particle ψ1(x) ≈ δ(x− x1) resp. ψ1(x) ≈ δ(x− x1)
we generalize into relativistic gravitational fields g1ij(x) resp. g
2
ij(x). For
ϕ(x) we have to solve now, instead of the classical Schro¨dinger equation, a
similar wave equation on these background metrics. We ignore the related
field-theoretical problems with particle creation and so on and assume that
the field equations may be solved without problems. Thus, we obtain two
solutions ϕ1(x) resp. ϕ2(x) for the two gravitational fields.
Now let’s consider the computation of the scalar product 〈ϕ1|ϕ2〉, using
the following naive formula as a base:
〈ϕ1|ϕ2〉 =
∫
ϕ¯1(x)ϕ2(x)dx3
The point is that this integral simply cannot be defined from point of view
of classical general relativity. Indeed, if g1ij(x) is a solution of the Einstein
equations, we may apply an arbitrary transformation of coordinates and
obtain the same solution in other coordinates. Now, if we apply such a
transformation to g1ij(x), the same transformation has to be applied to ϕ
1(x)
too to obtain the same solution in the other coordinates. But nothing requires
to apply the same transformation to g2ij(x) and ϕ
2(x). Now, if we apply
a coordinate transformation to ϕ1(x), but not to ϕ2(x), the result of the
integral changes in a completely arbitrary way.
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The same result may be formulated in another way: the functions ϕ1(x)
resp. ϕ2(x) are defined on different manifolds – the manifolds defined by the
spacetime metrics g1ij(x) resp. g
2
ij(x). And scalar products between functions
on different manifolds are simply undefined.
A third way to formulate this result is that this scalar product is only
c-covariant but not q-covariant. Indeed, the integral does not change if we
apply the same diffeomorphism to above configurations, but changes if we
apply different diffeomorphisms to above configurations. Therefore, it cannot
be observable in q-covariant quantum GR.
A consequence of this situation is that GR is completely unable to make
predictions for the scalar product, even if the scalar product is given for some
initial values. Indeed, assume we have fixed some initial values g1ij(x), ϕ
1(x),
g2ij(x), ϕ
2(x)|x0=0 and an appropriate number of derivatives. Thus, for the
initial values we have restricted the freedom of choice of diffeomorphisms.
But this does not help: there are diffeomorphisms which are identical for
the initial values, with all derivatives. And the Einstein equations define the
solution only modulo arbitrary diffeomorphisms.
What seems to be even more serious is that the problem appears al-
ready in the non-relativistic limit. In Schro¨dinger theory, the scalar product
is well-defined. But the gravitational field may be as close as possible to
the non-relativistic situation, the scalar product remains completely unde-
fined in relativistic theory. It seems therefore highly problematic to obtain
Schro¨dinger theory as the non-relativistic limit of a q-covariant theory of
quantum gravity.
D.3 The solution: a fixed space-time background
Let’s look now how this problem is solved in GET. We have some well-defined
Newtonian background which is common for all field configurations. The
additional term in the Lagrangian does not only give some additional term in
the Einstein equations, but breaks relativistic diffeomorphism invariance. We
have four additional equations – the harmonic coordinate equations. They
define the solution uniquely, not only modulo diffeomorphism.
Of course, “uniquely” is also a relative notion, it means relative to the
Newtonian background. We can use the covariant formulation of GET, with
a covariant equation for the variables used to define the background. The
conceptual difference is that this background is common for all solutions.
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The resulting quantum theory is not q-covariant, but only c-covariant. The
relative position between a general field configuration and the common New-
tonian background defines relative positions between different field configu-
rations. This allows to define scalar products as well as the notion “the same
diffeomorphism” which is necessary to define c-covariance.
Are there other ways to define the evolution of these scalar products? No.
By accepting the existence and observability of the scalar product we have
de facto accepted a common background manifold with preferred coordinates
for all semi-classical gravitational fields. Indeed, we need only a few number
of simple and natural restrictions to obtain a common position measurement
for all gravitational fields.
Assume as before that we have two configurations of gravitational fields
g1ij(x), g
2
ij(x) on manifolds M1 resp. M2 and some Hilbert space of appro-
priate wave functions H(M1) and H(M2). Now, we assume the element
ϕ1(x) ∈ H(M1) has well-defined “scalar products” with all elements of
H(M2). But in this case it defines a linear functional on H(M2). A linear
functional on H(M2) uniquely defines an element of H(M2). This construc-
tion defines a map H(M1)→ H(M2).
Now, this map seems to be the appropriate place to define additional
natural requirements. First, we need transitivity. If there are three spaces,
the map H(M1)→ H(M3) should be the same as the composition H(M1)→
H(M2) → H(M3). As a special case M1 = M3 we obtain that the map
H(M2) → H(M1) is the inverse of H(M1) → H(M2). Another property is
that they are norm-preserving. This is required to have a consistent proba-
bility interpretation. Above restrictions may be justified in the same way we
have justified the existence of the scalar product itself: these properties are
fulfilled in Schro¨dinger theory.
But, once we have a norm-preserving map H(M1)→ H(M2), we can use
it to transfer a measurement from M2 to M1. Especially, we can transfer the
position measurement for the manifold M2 to H(M1). Now, we can choose
an arbitrary solution as a reference solution and transfer its position mea-
surement to all other states as the common background. Thus, we obtain
a common background manifold for all field configurations. We are de-facto
back to the scheme we use in GET, with a fixed common space-time back-
ground.
Thus, if we follow the relativistic paradigm and develop a q-covariant
quantum theory of gravity, important observables of non-relativistic quantum
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gravity remain undefined. If we assume that they are well-defined, we have
to reject the relativistic paradigm and to introduce a common background
manifold into the theory. This consideration justifies the introduction of a
fixed space-time background into GET.
D.4 Comparison of Regge calculus and dynamical tri-
angulation
It is interesting to compare two well-known discrete approaches to quantum
gravity – the Regge calculus [61] and dynamical triangulations (DT) from
point of view of scalar product. In the Regge calculus, we have a fixed grid
and the geometry is described by the edge lengths of the grid. In contrast,
in DT the edge lengths are fixed but the triangulation varies.
Now, if we have some discrete functions defined for different geometries in
the Regge calculus, we can define their scalar product without problem – we
have the same grid as the base, therefore, for each point of one geometry we
have a well-defined notion of “the same point” on the other geometry. There-
fore, the Regge calculus is a nice example of a discrete c-covariant theory.
Instead, in DT we do not have such a possibility. The scalar product between
discrete functions on different triangulations is meaningless. Therefore, it is
an example of a discrete q-covariant approach.
Thus, according to the ideology presented here, DT should be the “cor-
rect” way to quantize geometry in a diffeomorphism-invariant way, but leads
to problems with the classical limit, while it should be reverse for the Regge
calculus. Indeed, the review [21] shows exactly these properties of the two
approaches: the Regge calculus with fixed grid contains steps of freedom
which are unphysical from point of view of relativity, especially modes cor-
responding to general coordinate transformations, but it “possesses a weak
field expansion in which contact can be made with continuum perturbation
theory”.
It is also noted that, at least for 2D, “the DT method affords a good
prescription for regulating quantum gravity”. But “there is no weak coupling
limit in which contact can be made with continuum perturbation theory.
Indeed, the attractive feature of this formulation – that it is purely geometric,
making no reference to coordinates and metric tensors also poses a problem;
how do such classical quantities emerge from the model at large distance”.
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I hope, these remarks help to clarify my understanding of the role of
the scalar product problem: it does not claim that q-covariant theories are
impossible. Instead, DT provides an example of the regularized version of
such a theory. It also does not claim that by accepting the existence of
a scalar product we immediately end with ether theory: there is a certain
difference between Regge QG and our ether approach, especially in our ether
approach the grid is not fixed, but moves, and the position of the grid nodes
are steps of freedom of the ether approach.
The point is that a q-covariant approach has to be rejected because of
the failure to define a scalar product between functions defined on different
solutions, because such scalar products are necessary in the non-relativistic
limit.
E Realism as a methodological concept
In § 15 we have not considered the EPR criterion of reality. There was no
necessity for this, because we have considered it as part of common sense.
To separate one of the common sense principles used in this proof and to
name it “EPR criterion” is not necessary in our approach. Instead, it is part
of the destruction strategy we have considered in section § 15.4.
Unfortunately, this destruction strategy was already successful. There-
fore, it seems necessary to consider the part of common sense which has been
named “EPR criterion of reality” and questioned in more detail.
E.1 Principles of different importance
If we have a contradiction between theory and experiment, there are always
different parts of the theory which may be blamed for the problem. But
often it is not too difficult to find the critical part. Usually it is very helpful
that different parts are not on the same level of fundamentality. We usually
can distinguish more and less fundamental parts of the theory, and in case of
conflict we usually blame the less fundamental parts to be the cause of the
problem. Let’s consider, for example, the dark matter problem. We observe
a difference between the Einstein equations and observation:
Gµν 6= 8piGT µνobs
83
In this case, we do not reject GR because it’s main equation is falsified
by observation. Instead, we simply define the energy-momentum tensor of
“dark matter” as
T µνdark = G
µν − 8piGT µνobs
and obtain that the Einstein equations are fulfilled. In this case, our
existing theory of matter is considered to be less fundamental. In this case,
this seems to be a reasonable choice.
We argue here that the situation is different for the violation of Bell’s
inequality. The other principles involved in the proof of Bell’s inequality,
which we denote here as the principles of realism and which include the
EPR criterion of reality, are more fundamental than the particular assump-
tion about space-time symmetry known as relativity. Especially, we argue
that these other principles are fundamental methodological principles, part
of the methodological foundations of science. Thus, they are important as in
physics, as in other sciences.
Note that this argument is only additional support for our argumentation.
There is already another argumentation which is completely sufficient for a
unique decision in favor of realism: There is independent evidence against
relativity – their problems with quantum gravity, especially the problem of
time (appendix C). Moreover, there is a viable competitor of relativity – ether
theory – which has been developed to solve these other problems. Instead,
nobody has proposed a theory which, for independent reasons, rejects realism.
Moreover, there is simply no independent evidence against realism: as we
have seen, quantum theory is compatible with realism.
E.2 A definition of reality and causal influence
Let’s try to define classical realism in a way which allows a strong mathemat-
ical proof of Bell’s inequality based on this notion of realism. Realism in the
common sense proposes the existence of an observer-external reality which
exists independent of our observation. The results of observations may be re-
sults of complex interactions between reality and observer, nothing requires
a possibility of direct observation. To define realism we need at least the
following three entities: of course the observables, but also the decisions
of the experimenters what to measure, and last not least the reality. But
that’s all we need:
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Axiom 1 (reality) Assume we have an experiment described by observables
X with the observable probability distribution ρX(X, x)dX. It depends on a
set of control parameters x which describe the experimental setup (the deci-
sions of experimenters).
A theory is realistic if it describes such probability distributions based on
a notion of reality – a space Λ (reality) with probability distribution ρλ(λ)dλ
– and a realistic explanation – a function X(x, λ) – so that for a test
function f
∫
f(X)ρX(X, x)dX =
∫
f(X(x, λ))ρ(λ)dλ
This formal definition is in quite good agreement with the common sense
idea that reality λ exists independent of our decisions x: the probability dis-
tribution ρ(λ) indeed does not depend on x. But it already incorporates the
insight that there is no pure observation, that our observations are only the
result of complex interactions between observer and reality. An argumenta-
tion that classical realism is invalid because observations are only the result
of such interactions is, therefore, invalid: this possibility is already part of
classical realism.
Note that already on this level, without any relation to space-time, we
can define causal influences in a natural way:
Axiom 2 (causal influence) If in a realistic theory an observable X de-
pends on a control parameter x in the realistic explanation X(x, λ), then we
have a causal influence of x on X.
E.3 Bell’s inequality as a fundamental property
These definitions are already sufficient for the proof of Bell’s inequality. In
the case of Bell’s inequality, the control parameters are the questions: your
question a to Alice and your friends question b to Bob. The observables are
their answers A and B. Using the definition of realism we obtain the existence
of two functions:
A = A(a, b, λ) = ±1; B = B(a, b, λ) = ±1
We also obtain the expectation value for the product AB as
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P (a, b) =
∫
ρ(λ)A(a, b, λ)B(a, b, λ)dλ.
Now we have to consider causality. If there is no causal influence of the
decision b on the result A, then we have A = A(a, λ) and resp. B = B(b, λ).
Thus, we obtain
P (a, b) =
∫
ρ(λ)A(a, λ)B(b, λ)dλ
which is simply formula (2) of [10]. After this, Bell’s inequality follows as
derived in [10].
As a consequence, we obtain the proof of Bell’s inequality on a level where
even the existence of something like space-time has not been mentioned, and
therefore in a space-time independent form: if it is violated, this proves the
existence of causal influences (a→ B) or (b→ A).
E.4 The methodological character of this definition
A remarkable property of this definition is its unfalsifiable character. What-
ever we observe, it is possible to describe it using a probability distribution
ρX(X, x)dX . Whatever this probability distribution is, we can always con-
struct a realistic theory which leads to this distribution – all we have to
do is to use a (sufficiently artificial) functional space to describe the real-
ity. Especially, reality may be described simply by the measure ρX(X, x)dX
itself.13
The reasonable question is about the purpose of this definition if it is
unfalsifiable. Now, there is a surprisingly simple answer: realism is simply
a methodological rule. It enforces to describe certain parts of the theory as
really existing . As well, the subsequent definition of a causal influence is also
unfalsifiable. The purpose of this definition is, as well, to enforce to name
some relations causal influence. In other words, this definition of realism and
causality enforces ontological clarity. A realistic theory is a theory where we
13As the many worlds interpretation, as Bohmian mechanics may be considered as re-
alistic theories obtained as variants of this “cheap” way – they simply accept the wave
function as reality.
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are forced to name some things real and some influences causal, even if this
violates our metaphysical prejudices or principles of the theory we prefer.
Especially this definition of realism and causality, a definition already
enforces that any violation of Bell’s theorem should be explained by causal
influences – or a→ B or b→ A.
E.5 Causality requires a preferred frame
It does not follow from the definition that these causal influences happen
in a preferred frame. To prove the existence of a preferred frame we need
a little bit more. First, the connection between causality and space-time.
Until now, even the existence of something like a space-time has not been
mentioned. Only now we have to define causality on space-time as a relation
x → y between space-time events x, y: x → y if there exists some a → A
so that the decision a is localized at x and the observation A localized at
y. Moreover, we need the most important property of causality: the causal
order along a world line and the absence of causal loops.
Axiom 3 (space-time causality) Causality defines a partial order x→ y
on space-time with the property that on time-like trajectories γ(t) we have
γ(t0)→ γ(t1) if t0 < t1.
Now, we can simply prove the existence of a preferred foliation: 14
Theorem 8 (existence of a preferred foliation) If for all pairs of
events Bell’s inequality may be violated, then there exists a preferred foli-
ation. It is defined by the property that if x → y than T (x) < T (y) for the
function T(x) which defines this foliation.
Proof: Let’s define the foliation as a time-like function T (xi, t). For this
purpose, we set T (0, t0) = t0 and define the points contemporary to A =
14That the existence of a preferred foliation follow is nothing new. Valentini [71] suggests
“that a preferred foliation of spacetime could arise from the existence of nonlocal hidden-
variables” [39]. Bell himself concludes [11]: “the cheapest resolution is something like going
back to relativity as it was before Einstein, when people like Lorentz and Poincare thought
that there was an aether — a preferred frame of reference — but that our measuring
instruments were distorted by motion in such a way that we could no detect motion
through the aether.”
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(0, 0, 0, t0) on the line B(t) = (x
1, x2, x3, t). We use the Dirichlet algorithm
on the line B(t). We start with a large enough interval (a0, b0) so that there
exists causal influences B(a0) → A → B(b0). Assume at step n we have
found an interval B(an) → A → B(bn) with |bn − an| < 2−n|b0 − a0|. Now,
we consider the element B(h = (bn + an)/2). Then we observe a violation
of Bell’s inequality between A and B(h). It follows from Bell’s theorem
that there should be A → B(h) or B(h) → A. In the first case, we set
an+1 = an, bn+1 = h, else an+1 = h, bn+1 = bn. In above cases we have found
an interval with B(an+1)→ A→ B(bn+1) with |bn+1−an+1| < 2−n−1|b0−a0|.
Therefore, we have a limit l = lim an = lim bn. This limit defines a function
T (x1, x2, x3, t0) = l.
To prove that the function T (x) is correctly defined, Lipschitz continuous,
and that the definition of the foliation does not depend on the choice of
coordinates is straightforward. What we need is that in every environment
of B(l) we have points an with B(an) → A as well as points bn with A →
B(bn), the non-existence of causal loops, and the existence of causal ordering
B(a)→ B(b)⇔ a < b on time-like trajectories B(t).
E.6 Relation between our definition and the EPR cri-
terion
Let’s consider now the difference between this definition of realism and the
EPR criterion of reality [28]:
If, without in any way disturbing a system, we can predict with
certainty ... the value of a physical quantity, than there exists an
element of physical reality corresponding to this physical quantity.
Now, this is a natural consequence of our definition of realism: We have
no “disturbance”, thus, no dependence of A on b: A = A(a, λ). If it is a
prediction, because we have no influence backward in time, we have no de-
pendence of B on a: B = B(b, λ). It is a prediction with certainty, thus, these
functions are identical as functions: A(., λ) = B(., λ). Last not least, λ is the
“element of reality” and the function A(., λ) describes the correspondence to
the physical quantity A.
The advantages of our new definition are, in our opinion, the following:
we have a general definition, while the EPR mentions a special situation –
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a correlation which allows to predict something with certainty, and we do
not depend on the notion of space-time, while the EPR criterion includes an
implicit reference to time (“predict”). Moreover, the formal character of the
definition allows to show its methodological character: it does not restrict
physical theories, but restricts our way to talk about them.
E.7 Methodological principles as the most fundamen-
tal part of science
Once we defend realism as a fundamental methodological principle it seems
useful to look how other fundamental principles of science may be defended.
There is another such fundamental methodological principle – classical logic,
especially the law that there should be no contradictions, nor in the theory,
nor between theory and observation. As our definition of realism and causal-
ity these principles are unfalsifiable themself – simply because the principle
of falsification itself relies on classical logic.15 Therefore, other arguments
have to be used to defend them. In this context, it is interesting how Popper
defends classical logic against “dialectical logic” ([56], p.316):
Dialecticians say that contradictions are fruitful, or fertile, or pro-
ductive of progress, and we have admitted that this is, in a sense,
true. It is true, however, only so long as we are determined not
to put up with contradictions, and to change any theory which
involves contradictions; in other words never to accept a contra-
diction: it is solely due to this determination of ours that criti-
cism, i.e. the pointing out of contradictions, induces us to change
our theories, and thereby to progress. It cannot be emphasized
too strongly that if we change this attitude, and decide to put
up with contradictions, then contradictions must at once lose any
kind of fertility.
Thus, the point of the argumentation is not to prove that there can be no
contradictions. The basic idea is that we have to consider not the hypothesis
15If they are false, then the method of falsification is false too, therefore, cannot be used.
Even if the use of rational arguments, especially the “therefore” in the last sentence, is
also unjustified, this argument seems to show that an experimental falsification of classical
logic is impossible.
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itself, but their influence on the future development of science. That means,
Popper defends classical logic as a methodological rule of science.
The main advantage of this argumentation is that we do not have to rely
on “common sense” – a notion which has a bad name in current science and
is usually compared with flat Earth theory. Classical logic is not a particular
common sense theory like flat Earth theory which may be false, but defines
the scientific method, therefore, if we reject classical logic, we simply reject
the scientific method.
Our notion of realism is fertile in the same sense as classical logic. It is the
rule to search for realistic, causal explanations for observable correlations. A
non-trivial, unexplained correlation plays the same role as the contradiction
in logic: it defines a scientific problem. We have to include a realistic expla-
nation into our theory. Nobody forces us to search for explanations, it is only
our own methodological decision not to accept unexplained correlations, and
to accept only a realistic explanation. If we give up the search for realistic
explanations, we loose an important way to reach scientific progress.
E.8 The methodological role of Lorentz symmetry
The great importance of Lorentz symmetry in modern physics is often pre-
sented as if it is a decisive argument against a preferred frame. But this sug-
gests that Lorentz symmetry would have been less important in the Lorentz
ether. Is there any evidence for this claim? I have never seen any justification
for this assumption. It is simply claimed, without justification, that people
would have been less eager to search for relativistic symmetry. The reverse
may be closer to truth. Instead, with the Lorentz ether as the leading ide-
ology, people would have tried to detect hidden Lorentz symmetry in usual
condensed matter theory.
Moreover, without doubt any part of the hidden variables which can be
made Lorentz-covariant would have been made Lorentz-covariant. An exam-
ple are the equations of GET presented here. The new equation for the pre-
ferred coordinates is a nice, well-known relativistic equation – the harmonic
equation. Moreover, the thesis is in obvious contradiction to the history of
the Lorentz ether. In the context of the Lorentz ether, by Poincare, the pro-
gram to make all physical theories Lorentz-invariant has been proposed in
general and realized for kinematics. The decision to reject the existence of a
preferred frame made by Einstein was in no way necessary for the develop-
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ment of this program.
The point is that to require a particular symmetry is not a general
methodological rule of scientific research. At best there is the related method-
ological rule to search for symmetries in general. But even this rule seems
much less fundamental than classical logic and realism: last not least, we
search for symmetries in reality. Symmetries are a powerful tool to study
realistic theories, to detect contradictions in such theories or between theory
and experiment – but only a tool, in no way a fundamental principle.
E.9 Discussion
As presented here, the preferred frame is the unavoidable consequence of the
violation of Bell’s inequality. Relativity is falsified by Aspect’s experiment,
and its current status should be rejected as an immunization. This is so
obvious that it becomes problematic to explain the unreasonable decision of
mainstream science to reject realism. But there are several factors which
may be blamed here:
• The absence of a reasonable theory of gravity with preferred frame.
This problem is solved now by GET.
• The widely accepted belief, based on von Neumann’s [54] theorem, that
hidden variable theories are impossible. This was justified at the time
the EPR criterion was proposed, but many seem to believe it even
today.
• The ignorance of Bohmian mechanics because it requires a preferred
frame.
• The extreme positivism and subjectivism during the foundational pe-
riod of quantum theory.
• The general ignorance of fundamental problems of quantum theory
today.
But the most important explanation seems to be Kuhn’s theory of
paradigm shifts [44]. According to Kuhn, paradigms are never falsified by
experiments. A paradigm may be rejected only if a new paradigm appears.
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Until now, no alternative paradigm has been proposed, therefore, to pre-
serve the relativistic paradigm was justified – in full agreement with Kuhn’s
paradigm shifts.
We propose here a new paradigm – a return to classical Newtonian space-
time and ether theory. With this paradigm as a competitor of the relativistic
paradigm it is no longer necessary to reject realism or causality.
F Bohmian mechanics
An essential property of non-relativistic Schro¨dinger theory is the existence of
a simple deterministic interpretation – Bohmian mechanics (BM). We refer
to this theory in our proof that EPR realism is not in conflict with non-
relativistic quantum theory. Unfortunately, BM is widely ignored. The main
reason for this ignorance seems to be that it requires a preferred frame –
thus, a feature which makes it particularly attractive in the context of GET.
Therefore, it seems reasonable to consider the basic features of BM here.
F.1 Simplicity of Bohmian mechanics
BM may be considered as a straightforward way to complete quantum me-
chanics. In BM, we have two entities: the “guiding wave” Ψ(q) defined on
the configuration space which fulfills the classical Schro¨dinger equation
i∂tΨ = HΨ
and the configuration Q(t) which fulfills the so-called “guiding equation”.
This guiding equation may be obtained in a straightforward way from quan-
tum mechanics. The basic observation is the following: quantum mechan-
ics provides us with a probability current ji(q) as well as with a probabil-
ity density ρ(q) = Ψ∗(q)Ψ(q). In classical mechanics they are related by
ji(q) = ρ(q)vi(q). Now it requires no great imagination to write the guiding
equation
dQ
dt
= vi =
ji
ρ
This defines the evolution of the state. Now, if in initially the state is in
the so-called “quantum equilibrium” ρ(q), then it remains in this state. This
follows from the continuity equation
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∂tρ(q, t) + ∂ij
i(q, t) = 0
That’s already all what is necessary. There is no need for further axioms.
Therefore, all we need for the definition of Bohmian mechanics is the quantum
probability current. For example, in non-relativistic multi-particle theory
H = −
N∑
k=1
~
2
m2k
∇2k + V (q1, . . . , qN)
this probability current is given by
jk =
~
mk
ℑ(ψ∗∇kψ)
Therefore, we obtain the guiding equation
dQk
dt
=
~
mk
ℑ∇kψ
ψ
F.2 Clarity of the interpretation
The first thing we have to note here is the ontological clarity. To quote Bell
([9], p.191):
Is it not clear from the smallness of the scintillation on the screen
that we have to do with a particle? And is it not clear, from
the diffraction and interference patterns, that the motion of the
particle is directed by a wave? ... This idea seems to me so
natural and simple, to resolve the wave-particle dilemma in such
a clear and ordinary way, that it is a great mystery to me that it
was so generally ignored. ...
This solution of the wave-particle confusion not the main point: in BM
there is also nothing strange with Schro¨dinger’s cat. The wave function of the
cat remains in its superpositional state, but the actual cat is in a well-defined
state. “There is no need in this picture to divide the world into ‘quantum’
and ‘classical’ parts. For the necessary ‘classical terms’ are available already
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for individual particles (their actual positions) and so also for macroscopic
assemblies of particles.” ([9], p.192)
Another interesting question is worth to be mentioned: why are the states
we observe in quantum equilibrium? This question has an interesting answer:
decoherence. “One of the best descriptions of decoherence, though not he
word itself, can be found in Bohm’s 1952 ‘hidden variables’ paper [16]. We
wish to emphasize, however, that while decoherence plays a crucial role in
the very formulation of the various interpretations of quantum theory loosely
called decoherence theories, its role in Bohmian mechanics is of quite different
character: For Bohmian mechanics decoherence is purely phenomenological
– it plays no role whatsoever in the formulation (or interpretation) of the
theory itself” [27].
The most important property of BM is it’s compatibility with classical
principles: the EPR criterion of reality, classical causality, determinism. Let’s
quote again Bell ([9], p.163):
It is easy to find good reasons for disliking the de Broglie-Bohm
picture. Neither de Broglie nor Bohm liked it very much; for both
of them it was only a point of departure. Einstein also did not
like it very much. He found it ‘too cheap’, although, as Born
remarked, ‘it was quite in line with his own ideas’. But like it
or lump it, it is perfectly conclusive as a counter example to the
idea that vagueness, subjectivity, or indeterminism, are forced on
us by the experimental facts covered by non-relativistic quantum
mechanics.
F.3 Relativistic generalization
Let’s consider now the main point why many researchers dislike BM – its
relativistic generalization. The same basic scheme works as well in relativistic
theory and field theory. For example, for multiple Dirac particles Bohm [17]
has proposed the following guiding equation:
vk =
ψ+αkψ
ψ+ψ
For the general case of quantum field theory, we have to accept the lec-
tures of quantum field theory what is the appropriate notion of the wave
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function: “Certainly the Maxwell field is not the wave function of the pho-
ton, and for reasons that Dirac himself pointed out, the Klein-Gordon fields
we use for pions and Higgs bosons could not be the wave functions of the
bosons. In its mature form, the idea of quantum field theory is that quantum
fields are the basis ingredients of the universe, and particles are just bundles
of energy and momentum of the fields. In a relativistic theory the wave
function is a functional of these fields, not a function of particle coordinates”
[78]. Thus, it does not make sense to search for a guiding equations for par-
ticles in the general case, and we have to consider Bohmian field theory [17]
where we obtain a guiding equation for generalized coordinates – the field
configuration.
Thus, the generalization itself is not problematic. It is an essential prop-
erty of this generalization – that it has an explicit preferred frame on the
fundamental level. The predictions are nonetheless Lorentz-invariant. For
example, ψ+ψ is an equivariant ensemble density in the chosen reference
frame. It reproduces the quantum predictions in this frame. These pre-
dictions don’t contain a trace of the preferred frame. Lorentz invariance
holds on the observational, but not on the fundamental level. The 4-tuple
(ψ+ψ, ψ+αkψ) is not a 4-vector for N > 1.
This is not an accident. “There does not in general exist a probability
measure P on N-paths for which the distribution of crossing ρΣ agrees with
the quantum mechanical distribution on all space-like hyper-planes Σ” [12].
This assertion is a more or less immediate consequence of Bell’s inequality:
by means of a suitable placement of appropriate Stern-Gerlach magnets the
inconsistent joint spin correlations can be transformed to (the same) incon-
sistent spatial correlations for particles at different times [12]. Thus, we have
the probability measure ρ = |ψ|2 only in one frame. But this measure in
just one frame is sufficient to derive the quantum mechanical predictions for
observations at different times.
F.4 Discussion
The fact that Lorentz invariance does not hold on the fundamental level is
often considered as a decisive argument against BM. But from point of view
of ether theory this becomes a virtue rather than a vice: every argument
in favour of BM becomes an argument in favour of the preferred frame we
use in ether theory. To use the argument “there is no fundamental Lorentz-
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invariance” against BM in this context would be simply circular reasoning
– a main concept of ether theory is as well that there is no fundamental
Lorentz-invariance.
Thus, BM gives additional support for one of the main ingredients of
GET – the preferred absolute time. One the other hand, GET gives support
to BM – it shows a way to generalize BM to gravity. We do not have to
try to find Lorentz-invariant versions of BM, as tried, for example, in [12].
Instead, we can apply BM as it is, with a preferred frame, in GET or, even
better, in an atomic ether theory.
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